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Executive summary 
In 2002 the UK Department for International Development (DFID) provided electoral assistance for 
local and regional elections. Partners included 23 NGOs and local and national government actors. Their 
mission was to create an electoral process that was more inclusive of poor, excluded people in rural Peru. 
This mission quickly expanded beyond mere electoral monitoring and civic education and undertook a 
wider transformation of citizen attitudes, government practices, and national institutions. The 
programmes undertaken by the various partners were gathered under the heading, El Gol, and they 
targeted five Andean highland departments of Peru. 
The current report is the product of an evaluation of several aspects of the project. The research 
included interviews with El Gol partners, local government officials, international donor representatives, 
and members of civil society. 
The El Gol programme applied a rights-based and pro-poor approach to electoral assistance with 
particular attention to poor, rural, local districts. The report evaluates the impact of El Gol using a 
political framework that emphasises the operation of rights-based and pro-poor approaches in the context 
of clientelist local authorities. The most interesting finding may be that rights-based, participatory 
practices can encourage transformation of clientelist settings to promote more pro-poor outcomes. 
Regional findings 
The regional reality in Peru includes weak parties, feeble civil society, and an elite class that has reinserted 
traditional clientelist practices to regional institutions. Incipient opposition and popular movements were 
making inroads, but they had largely failed to penetrate political power at the regional level. El Gol 
worked with a bottom-up strategy that fortified pro-poor mayors and a centre-periphery strategy that 
attempted to use a Lima-base to influence the rules shaping regional behaviour. Several regional 
observations deserve note: 
• Coalitions of pro-poor mayors and opposition movements pressure regional authorities and force a 
distribution towards the rural areas. 
• The same actors have claimed spaces for voice and participation at the regional level. 
• I .ima-based lobbying created legislation that strengthened the weight of participatory and 
consultative entities in regional government. 
Despite these important advances, a few warnings about the constraints on a pro-poor and rights-based 
approach at the regional level are in order. 
• The national government is sceptical of the potential for effective regional governance, and the timid 
Organic Law of the Regions reflects that unease. 
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• Revenues and authority transferred to the regions are wholly inadequate to undertake major 
functions, and some of these functions transferred are probably more appropriately located at 
another level of government. 
• It is also clear that authorities in the regions are sceptical of institutions biased towards pro-poor and 
rights-based approaches, such as the Regional Coordination Councils (CCRs). 
• Regional authorities are minimising the importance of the CCRs and using patronage to influence the 
behaviour of province and district mayors. 
• The CCRs themselves are flawed. The 40 per cent threshold for civil society participation and the 
registration requirement for civil society organisations are likely to constrain the capacity of many 
opposition groups. 
• CCRs are structured largely as consultative and consensus-building institutions, and they therefore 
lack real teeth to hold regional authorities accountable. As a result, they are unlikely to evolve into 
anything like a participator}' or representative regional level legislative branch. 
The main conclusion to be drawn from this analysis is that one of the biggest problems for civil society in 
Peru is the weakness of political society. Political parties are not doing their job at the regional level. The 
pro-poor and rights-based approaches that El Gol advanced made some important, though limited 
progress in strengthening civil society. For civil society to encourage a change in political practice at the 
regional level, mayors and progressive movements must insert themselves at the regional level in a 
coordinated way. They will require resources and allies beyond their borders. El Gol NGO partners 
provided some of the resources, capacity and alliances that were necessary in the short term. In the longer 
term, more reliable institutional allies will be necessary. 
Local findings 
New local authorities face the challenge of building viable institutions in the context of a weak state, 
fragmented civil society, and intense poverty. In particular, the challenges of constituting local authorities 
has remained factionalised into pro- and anti-Fujimori sections of the local elite. The institutions that 
could operate in this context combined pro-poor, rights-based approaches in the context of pervasive 
clientelism. It has to be acknowledged that local social practices were unlikely to disappear overnight, and 
they continued to exhibit traditional clientelism. Such social norms militate against the full realisation of 
rights and participation, particularly for women, and perpetuate inefficient and unequal public policy. 
These traditional clientelist techniques build support for elites and sustain their power by exchanging 
material benefits for obedience by poorer citizens. 
Despite the political, economic, and social inequalities that reinforce traditional clientelism, the 
rights-based and pro-poor approach of El Gol made important strides in strengthening citizenship. 
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Districts in which El Gol partners had worked used rights-based participation to channel benefits to poor 
supporters and potential allies, and in so doing, shifted the terms of clientelist exchange. Several positive 
local trends deserve note: 
• Participation engaged citizens in policy formulation and decision-making. 
• Citizens were given ownership and responsibility to ensure the success of policies. 
• Citizens offered their own resources and time to the public good, and they used participatory spaces 
to hold authorities accountable. 
• Authorities in El Gol provinces tended to favour long-term, rural, and participatory priorities. Non-
El Gol provinces maintained a short-term, urban, and material focus. 
The key innovation in rural Peru was a strategic structure of participation. By biasing the sites of 
participation and the pattern of decision-making towards the poor and rural districts, voices of poor, 
campesino citizens were privileged. As a result, these groups could mobilise to obtain material resources and 
realise their rights. The new institutions further privileged these groups by tying rights to active 
participation. This reinforced the notion that citizens receive their benefits on the basis of their active 
links to local authorities. 
As was evident at the regional level, one cannot ignore the importance of political society to 
solidifying and realising citizenship gains. The advances that El Gol contributed to realising citizenship 
rights tended to be geographically, electorally, and fiscally bounded: in other words, in districts where 
progressive leaders committed themselves to participation, El Gol programmes advanced citizenship. In 
neighbouring districts and higher levels of government, traditional elites dominated and presented real 
threats that clientelism would return. 
The sustainability of localised experiments in rights based approaches is likely to depend on the 
ability to institutionalise and spread progressive movements. New authorities in poor districts where El 
Gol attempted to expand citizenship faced continued problems related to scarcity and institutional 
weakness. Some local leaders dealt with scarcity by searching for additional resources beyond their borders 
and could erect fragile institutions of participation. The main protection from a return to clientelism was 
additional resources through cross-jurisdiction and inter-governmental cooperation. Governments linked 
across districts and provinces granted leaders a wider area to draw resources and pool administrative, 
material and other assets. These alliances could also be used to secure resources from higher level 
governments. 
In sum, what began as an electoral assistance programme was actually an effort to bring a rights-
based and pro-poor approach to local governance. El Gol partners contributed to a transformation in 
traditional patterns of unequal and inefficient clientelism. In its place, a new and improved style of 
governance was emerging. Participation and pro-poor policies were central to this approach, and it 
transformed some of the terms of clientelist exchange. The result was improved governance at the local 
level. Still, a real risk exists that new patterns of governance can slip back into old patterns of clientelism: 
• The privileged sites of participation for the poor cannot be allowed to disappear or slip into 
exclusionary mechanisms captured by the rich. 
• To date, cross-district alliances have largely concentrated on securing additional resources for each 
district. This effort should be formalised and institutionalised, if possible. 
• Local leaders should consider coordinating the way in which thev build political support. A shared set 
of institutions, policies, and practices can ensure that cross-district collaboration continues on the 
basis of participatory institutions and pro-poor policies. 
• Weak institutions at the regional level should be strengthened through cross-district alliances based 
on rights-based and pro-poor approaches. 
• Political parties are currently weak, but they might be the most decisive actors in aggregating 
provincial movements. To sustain improved governance, rights-based, pro-poor policies should be at 
the centre of partisan efforts to create district, provincial and regional voices. 
Future implications 
The key conclusions of these findings relate to the transformation of clientelism through the construction 
of citizenship and formal institutions. Clientelist practices thrive on poverty and weak institutions. In 
patron-client networks, disempowered citizens depend on powerful informal authorities, and the result is 
inequality, weak democracy, and continued poverty. These examples of poor governance remain pervasive 
in many parts of rural Peru because there is little local demand for citizenship; alternatives to traditional 
leaders are weak; and few resources exist to build formal institutions. Quite simply, there are few 
alternatives to clientelism. The El Gol project was quite ingenious in articulating an alternative form of 
local governance based on rights. 
One aspect of the El Gol project deserves particular note because it was unusual. Local, regional, and 
national NGOs acted like an imported middle class for rural communities where there was hardly any 
autonomous capacity for change. El Gol partner NGOs articulated demands for citizenship, provided the 
leadership and capacity that could contribute to formal institution-building, and worked to secure 
resources from outside. In short, El Gol provided an alternative to clientelism because it forged an alliance 
between the rural poor, indigenous progressive leaders, and middle class NGO allies. 
El Gol opted to operate through NGOs and civil society actors who might strategically ally with 
some local politicians but would mostly operate outside formal electoral politics. This was probably a wise 
choice given the notorious weakness of Peruvian parties and their poor track record on combating 
clientelism. On the other hand, parties have one significant advantage over NGOs — they do not depend 
on the whims of external donors. NGOs have few resources of their own, and the impending closure of 
DFID offices suggests resource pressures are likely to increase. By contrast, parties can generate their own 
resources, and they can sustain cross-class and cross-geographic alliances through attaining public power. 
El Gol partners indirectly contributed to progressive partisan practices in several localised circumstances. 
If a more formalised and institutionalised progressive party could emerge, one could more confidently 
speak of a sustainable alternative to traditional clientelism. For the moment, the El Gol network of 
NGOs, local leaders and citizen organisations offers a temporary, though important, alternative. 
Map 1 Peru 
Reproduced by kind permission of Instituto Nacional de Estadistica y Informatica (www.inei.gob.pe). 
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Section 1: Introduction 
Is it possible to advance the interests of the poor in a rights-based framework in the presence of persistent 
clientelist structures? It seems unlikely. Though patrons have long built networks by targeting poor clients, 
pro-poor policies are not often the outputs. Clientelism is the polar opposite of citizenship, universal 
access, and participation. To change clientelism, citizens must demand their rights, alternatives to 
traditional leaders must emerge, and formal institutions must replace informal ones. 
In the context of local level elections in Peru, DFID worked to enhance a rights-based approach to 
governance. The projects, gathered under the heading 'El Gol', targeted conflict-torn, poverty-stricken 
rural areas of the Andean highlands where the state and civil society were weak. The project worked with 
potential officials, with civil society organisations, and with actors at the regional and national levels. In 
the zones the projects reached, it is clear that there was an increase in policymaking access for excluded 
groups and an improvement of pro-poor outcomes. It is also clear that expanding rights have not 
eliminated clientelism, but rather have introduced a new, pro-poor and rights-based approach in the 
context of pervasive clientelism. The paradoxical combination that has resulted sheds light on the local 
context of Andean Peru, the role of clientelism in political and social institution-building, and the complex 
relationship between rights, institutions, and development. 
Background 
During the 1980s and 1990s, Peru was torn by political violence, economic instability and social exclusion. 
Relative tranquillity was slowly restored to the cities, but the rural poor remained excluded from the larger 
polity. In particular, they remained subjects in traditional clientelist and authoritarian networks. This posed 
a challenge for the return to democracy that occurred in 2001 and was followed in 2002 by elections at the 
local and regional level. There was a real danger that traditional clientelist relations would solidify through 
incipient electoral processes. Facing a legacy of demobilised and disarticulated society and a fragmented 
political elite, DFID sought to bring a rights-based and pro-poor approach to the 2002 elections through a 
series of projects under the El Gol label. 
Distant, poor areas lacked viable and authoritative institutions. No state or civil society entity existed 
to reach distant and isolated communities, and many citizens were left on the margins of social, economic, 
and political life. The only institutions that reached them were traditional clientelist networks that 
exchanged material benefits for obedience and resulted in inefficient and unequal outcomes. Targeted, 
particularist, patron-client exchange was an ingrained cultural trait that would not disappear overnight. 
The durability of clientelism was more than cultural; it also served the purpose of managing resources and 
power in the context of abject poverty and weak institutions. The major contribution of El Gol was to 
begin a transition in old clientelist institutions by introducing rights-based participation and a pro-poor 
targeting of resources. This did not eliminate clientelism, but it did alter the terms of particularist exchange 
in ways that were more inclusive for poor citizens. 
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The unique management style adopted by DFID deserves mention. The context of poverty and 
exclusion that existed in rural Peru required flexibility in the techniques and methodologies applied. Local 
partners were encouraged to develop their own solutions, and bottom-up practices and participation in 
designing programmes was encouraged. In part, this flowed from the bottom-up, rights-based approach 
adopted overall. Further, institutional uncertainty meant that centralised control would have been difficult 
and ill-advised anyway. Typical of the institutional uncertainty that existed, laws regulating the different 
local authorities changed frequently, even up to the moment of elections. For example, citizens and El 
Gol partners were working to expand citizenship for regional entities whose authority was not yet defined. 
DFID and HI Gol partners adopted a flexible management style. The result was that rights-based and pro-
poor approaches obtained a distinctively local flavour. Each local project developed unique interventions 
that matched the citizenship demands and institutional needs of the local context. 
This approach to management followed a rights-based, pro-poor perspective on development. 
Rights-based approaches recognise universal citizenship rights, enshrined in law and international 
convention, and interpreted to fit local contexts. In Peru, basic rights are denied to many poor, indigenous 
and women citizens. By equipping excluded groups with the tools to develop solutions, have a voice, and 
organise their interests, El Gol sought to make them conscious and purposive actors in the development 
process. Ideally, this would enhance their ability to secure benefits from the state, encourage state 
responsibility to meet its obligations, and give excluded groups a voice in defining their rights. 
Over 20 local and national organisations participated in the El Gol electoral assistance project. The 
regions targeted were the five Andean highland departments, and specific efforts were made to reach poor 
rural districts. On the basis of partner and DITD analysis, the project expanded rapidly beyond mere 
electoral monitoring and civic education. In addition to these activities, DFID partners worked to 
strengthen citizen organisations, state institutional capacity, cross-district alliances, and national 
frameworks for participation and governance. 
These activities sought to change democratic political processes. Citizens were taught to exercise 
their political rights. The conduits between citizens and the state, especially the media and partisan 
organisations, were strengthened. Government agencies were trained and encouraged to meet their 
obligations to citizens. National institutions were lobbied and pressured to recognise and strengthen local 
democracy. One of the underlying assumptions of the project was that enhanced political rights for the 
poor would result in improvements in economic and social rights as they gained access to policymaking, 
public funds, and altered social relations. 
Scope of the report 
This report includes the research and findings conducted in an evaluation of El Gol partners and impacts. 
The principal researchers conducted desk reviews of literature on rights-based approaches and spent 
several weeks in Peru visiting El Gol partners and districts where El Gol had operated. The visits 
provided invaluable information on the realities of local democracy in Peru. Partners and DFID personnel 
were eager informants and collaborators in the studv. Based on the visit, additional research was 
conducted to understand the nature and operation of traditional clientelist structures and the way they 
evolve. 
In Section 2, the literatures that address clientelism and rights-based approaches provide the 
backdrop to the analysis of Peru. To highlight the relative uniqueness of the El Gol approach, other 
experiences in electoral assistance also receive a brief discussion. Among the experiences reviewed, only 
Nigeria appears to exhibit similar interventions that address fragile civil society, a fragmented and weak 
party system, and local democratisation that is both recent and insecure. After the literature and electoral 
assistance review, Section 3 turns to the Peruvian context in more detail. The detail from Peru highlights 
the local, regional, and national efforts made by El Gol partners to bring a rights-based and pro-poor 
approach to electoral assistance. In addition, a specific effort was made to evaluate the impact of El Gol 
on local authorities. A comparative case study of four districts draws out the differences between areas 
where El Gol operated and areas that lay beyond the reach of El Gol partners. The report closes in 
Section 4 with findings. 
Section 2: Literature review and international experience 
Clientelism 
Clientelism describes the low-level citizenship, weak institutions, and power inequalities that are typical of 
places like rural Peru. Scott describes it in terms of the material and moral ties that exist between patron 
and client, 'The patron-client relationship — an exchange relationship between roles - may be defined as a 
special case of dyadic (two-person) ties involving a largely instrumental friendship in which an individual 
of higher socioeconomic status (patron) uses his own influence and resources to provide protection and 
benefits, or both, for a person of lower status (client) who, for his part, reciprocates by offering general 
support and assistance, including personal services, to the patron' (Scott 1977: 126-7). 
Political anthropologists, sociologists, and political scientists have long been interested in clientelist 
practices. As the citation above indicates, these relationships generally involve unequal exchanges of 
personal and material favours between a patron and a client. Clients depend on patrons for necessities, 
such as land, work, or access to basic services, and patrons cultivate this dependence by tying benefits, to 
the extent possible, to obedience. 
In Latin America, the precise combination of material and moral mechanisms vary with the context 
and have generated numerous subtypes of patrons, including caudillos, caciques, and populists. Such patterns 
are common in poorly developed rural areas, where unequal landholding creates dependency and weak 
state penetration leaves room for patrons to impose their own authority. For similar reasons, urban slums 
also provide fertile ground for patronage networks, as urban elites can manipulate access to basic services 
and work in exchange for client obedience (Gay 1994). 
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The result of patron-client relations is almost always unfair and rarely efficient. Patrons cede only 
what is absolutely necessary, and clients usually possess insufficient leverage to extract many concessions. 
In fact, most patron-client networks reproduce and exacerbate inequality. Further, by directing resources 
towards sustaining patronage networks, real opportunities to improve welfare through efficient uses of 
resources are missed. 
If patron-client systems are so unfair and inefficient, the obvious question to ask is why do they 
persist? One answer is that clientelism provides a semblance of order in the presence of many problems 
generated by intense poverty. Poverty implies scarcity, uncertainty, and vulnerability, and each of these 
fragile conditions operates on multiple dimensions. Poor citizens are quite often triply burdened. They 
face economic destitution in which they lack access to resources and the means of production. They are 
culturally excluded by the denigration of their language, dress and customs. They are political 
disenfranchised by a lack of interest groups or political actors that can offer the leadership and 
organisation to incorporate them into public life. 
In the presence of extreme poverty, patron-client structures thrive, and they thrive precisely because 
they address multidimensional aspects of poverty. Patron-client relations manage resources, establish a 
cultural idiom of practices, and impose order. The results are inefficient and unfair, but they are 
surprisingly difficult to change. 
The first problem associated with poverty is economic. People in poor areas lack access to resources, 
livelihoods — and especially in rural areas - land. Patronage networks manage, and reproduce, questions of 
resource scarcity. Patrons control resources, and distribute particularism material benefits to individual 
clients (Krie 1988). Generally, this sustains and exacerbates material poverty. To sustain their networks, 
patrons secure benefits from other patrons or external actors, such as higher levels of government. A 
tvpical pattern is for a pyramid of clientelist relations to manage resources across multiple levels of patrons 
and client At local level, villages and families of clients are dependent on a local notable or political 
broker. These actors, in turn, are the clients to higher level regional bosses or authorities that patch 
together various local units. The pyramid continues upwards, with patronage resources and protection 
flowing downwards in exchange for loyalty, power, and surplus. Moving up the pyramid, patrons must 
manage sufficient resources to sustain their networks below, and at each level, power and resources are 
siphoned off by patrons before passing a few crumbs downward. Obviously, those at the bottom suffer 
the most. The burden of the multiple tiers of patron authority rests on their shoulders, and at most, they 
are kept barely above subsistence. 
A second problem associated with poverty- is social. Poor clients are held as subjects obedient to 
traditional norms and values. Patrons sustain and reinforce these values through the exchange of gifts and 
favours, often in elaborate cultural rituals. The patterns of ritual establish what kinds of client demands are 
legitimate and how demands are to be expressed. Patrons form multi-stranded moral ties with clients, such 
as fictitious family ties in which the patron takes on rhetorical, religious, or communal roles as head of a 
family of clients. Skilful patrons aggregate these personal relationships into appeals that tie entire 
population groups together in a network of personalistic loyalties that underwrite relationships between 
4 
high-status patrons and low-status clients. This establishes and sustains a pecking order in which clients 
are denied basic cidzenship rights and are held as obedient subjects. Obedience operates with moral 
overtones that further restrict the potential actions of clients and tie them deeper into patronage networks 
(Movnihan and Glazer 1964). 
The moral and material dimensions of clientelism are wrapped into political institutions. Patron-
client ties form multistranded, informal institutions that can be used to sustain the status quo. At precise 
moments, the informal institutions and networks of patrons and clients can be mobilised to stage protests, 
articulate demands, and win elections. During electoral campaigns, patrons often surface, distribute 
material benefits and symbolic promises, and call on their clients for support. These moments are unusual 
in occurring sporadically and through formal mechanisms like elections. The constant practice of patron-
client ties operates through informal institutions that sustain an exclusionary political order. The main 
tools patrons deploy are the varied mechanisms of dependence that keep poorer clients in line. 
At times, political order can take a more sinister hue as patrons make use of repression. It is not 
uncommon for patrons to invest part of their surplus in a coercive apparatus. Coercion alone cannot 
sustain a patron-client network, but the effective deployment of force can impose a reign of fear over a 
large population. Fear limits the demands articulated by clients, and coercion allows patrons to control the 
number of clients they must sustain. When new clients emerge or new demands grow, patrons calculate 
the potential costs in material resources against the potential benefit in political and moral support. At 
times, patrons find it advisable to exclude new clients, something old clients may willingly support, rather 
than spread material benefits among a wider group. 
Clients are not wholly without power within patronage networks. In fact, many studies have 
demonstrated that clients are skilful at playing patrons against each other, bargaining to obtain improved 
terms of exchange, and dissembling or foot-dragging to lower their obligations (Scott 1985). Though they 
are at a serious disadvantage, clients find mechanisms of survival and constantly negotiate their position 
within relations to patrons. 
Patron-client networks can thus be seen as a less than elegant mechanism of managing supply and 
demand. Patrons benefit from the moral support, political authority, and material surplus that they extract 
from clients. In conditions of scarcity, client demand for patronage resources can be great and patrons 
have only a limited supply of patronage to distribute. One can expect patrons to seek new resources; and, 
if these cannot be secured, patrons will exclude or repress clients rather than face the cost of carrying 
them. 
Most observers criticise the obvious inequalities in the positions of patrons and clients and point to 
consistently inadequate outcomes for development. Poor clients should not have to negotiate with patrons 
to obtain resources or promise obedience to arcane personalistic hierarchies; they have a basic right to 
universal access, equal voice, and basic well-being (Riddell 1998). In addition, patron-client ties sustain 
inefficient productive practices, corrupt use of state resources, and poor development outcomes. 
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Still, clientelist relations persist. In fact, for generations reformers have made only marginal inroads 
to eliminate patron-client ties. To transform clientelism in the presence of intense, multidimensional 
poverty is not simple. It requires an institutional alternative. 
Patrons manage resource scarcity partly by limiting the number and kinds of claims that clients can 
make, and there is a limit to the resources they can generate through attaching themselves to wider 
pyramids of patron-client networks. When patron-client networks cannot meet rising demands, or when 
alternative sources of benefits emerge, clientelism is unsustainable. It does not mean that it will disappear, 
however. Reformers must come armed with material benefits with which to outbid traditional patrons. 
Patrons also manage social exclusion by establishing a limited basis of demand-making. In particular 
they limit demands to divisible, particularistic material benefits. Yet, if clients organise and demand 
citizenship rights instead of material benefits, clientelism cannot respond. Again, this does not mean that 
clientelism will disappear automatically. Reformers must offer an alternative set of norms and practices. 
Finally, patrons manage weak political institutions with a mixture of material and cultural dependence 
and physical coercion. Clients remain trapped in informal networks because they lack the leadership and 
skills to organise a different set of political institutions. Once again, reformers must offer an alternative set 
of formal institutions that can compete with informal patron-client relations. 
Clientelism addresses poverty in an imperfect and exclusionary way, but it does not disappear 
overnight. For clientelism to disappear, an alternative source of material resources, cultural practices, and 
political institutions must emerge. Rights-based approaches advance such an alternative. 
Rights-based approaches 
Various practical and intellectual paths converged in the 1990s in a rights-based approach to 
development.' Right-based approaches imply a web of responsibilities and rights that tie individuals to 
states in mutually accountable relationships. Rights-based approaches also articulate relationships within 
society in which all citizens are equal participants in the development process. As a basis for 
argumentation, rights-based approaches advance universal participation and the use of power and wealth 
to provide minimal well-being for all citizens (Robertson 1994). The rights-based approach to 
development is based on the premise that the denial of human rights is inherent in poverty, and therefore 
addressing poverty requires working towards the realisation of rights. The practice of rights-based 
approaches is an ongoing process that involves contestation around both the meaning and importance of 
rights (Kyben 2003). 
In part, the origins of tights-based approaches can be traced to international human rights 
frameworks that underlie international agreements in the United Nations and other multilateral 
institutions. Such frameworks began with agreements around civil and political liberties, and thev have 
More information on rights-based approaches can be found on Development Resource Centre on Citizenship, 
Participation and Accountability authored pages on 'Participation.net: Information for Change' website, 
www.pnet.ids.ac.uk, 2004). 
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evolved over time to include deeper and broader rights including socio-economic rights to minimal 
welfare. Once agreed, international organisations defending rights-based approaches work towards 
enforcing these standards on ratifying countries (Evben 2003). 
It is useful to note that the deepening and broadening of the international human rights framework 
has been related to the specific efforts of various local, national, and international struggles to include 
socio-economic rights. In particular, women, landless, indigenous and other subordinate groups have used 
mobilisation around rights to obtain resources and participate in the decisions which affect their lives. Bv 
pressing for the legalisation of basic socio-economic rights, these movements attempt to redefine the 
legitimate framework that governs public and private life (Cornwall and Gaventa 2001). 
Intellectual support for these and other movements has been provided bv academic theories that 
emphasise the transformation of state institutions from particularistic, and often exclusionary, practices 
towards rights-based practices that emphasise universal treatment and access for all citizens (Gillies 1993). 
This emphasises a shift from beneficiaries/clients of services to the realisation of rights for citizens 
(Cornwall and Gaventa 2000). In other words, a rights-based approach thus sees and treats people as 
citizens — an individual with rights, rather than someone receiving benefits or buying services. Such a shift 
can only emerge when multiple lines of accountability between state and citizen and among citizens enable 
citizens to defend their rights (Eyben 2003). Rights-based approaches thus bring accountability and 
responsibility into development (Hughes et al. 2004). 
For some, rights and citizenship have to be actively realised. This implies that rights only become real 
when they are mobilised and activated through direct civic engagement. In fact, some see the very act of 
participating as a basic right. Direct engagement allows people to gain information, express demands, and 
hold authority accountable. People become agents and subjects, rather than objects of their own 
development (Cornwall and Gaventa 2000; Eyben 2003; Cornwall and Gaventa 2001). 
The active dimension of rights is especially important to theorists of citizenship and participation 
who highlight the transformative and consciousness-raising impact of action. According to Pateman 
(1980), the opportunity and act of participation constructs and builds more self-aware and engaged 
citizens and alters and enhances citizen consciousness. People become more aware of their own rights, 
more socially conscious about the rights of others, and more educated about their corresponding 
responsibilities to participate in decision-making processes (Eyben 2003). In this framework, the process 
by which decisions are reached is as important, or more important, than the decisions themselves. 
Seeing participation as a citizenship right also provides an entry point to recognise and overcome 
social, economic and political power differentials and dynamics (Cornwall 2002). Differences in awareness, 
access, and voice mean that citizens do not enjoy equal capacity to participate (Gaventa and Valderrama 
1999). A hungry, homeless or illiterate person will not be able to demand rights to participate and is 
unlikely to be capable of engaging in a participator)' process (Eyben 2003, Mungoven 2003). In fact, the 
capacity of the poor to realise their right to participate presupposes not only an active knowledge of this 
political right, but more fundamental access to basic economic and social rights that meet basic survival 
needs (Hughes et al. 2004). Therefore, the right to participate requires first a basic and fundamental access 
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to resources and knowledge. By placing these rights at the same status and as a prerequisite for 
participation, rights-based approaches offer a mechanism to attack inequality and provide privileged access 
to participation for those who had previously been excluded. 
The convergence of these strands in rights-based approaches to development in the 1990s changed 
the basis of thinking and arguing about development. Citizens gained a new mechanism to demand 
participation and make claims. Critical to the appeal of rights-based approaches, all citizens enjoyed rights 
equally and could be brought into a coalition in support of rights-based approaches. Rich and poor, 
included and excluded - all were potential allies in protecting equal rights. Few exclusionary groups could 
oppose a coalition around universally equal access, and this made a rights-based approach particularly 
powerful as a way of mobilising energy, power, and resources (Tomasevski 2000). 
Rights-based approaches offer an important alternative to clientelism. Firstly, they are a substitute for 
the exclusionary moral tenets of clientelism. Clientelism is based on hierarchy, authoritarianism, and 
particularist exchange. Rights based approaches offer equality, democracy and universal provision. These 
norms challenge traditional clientelist norms, and offer a new mechanism to argue against exclusion. 
Rights based approaches also offer a political substitute for the informal networks of clientelism. 
Clientelism ties traditional authorities to poor clients in a multistranded network of material, social, and 
political dependence. Repression and coercion are common tools of traditional authorities, and the main 
output is inequality and sustaining the status quo. Rights based approaches make a different coalition 
politics possible. Middle sectors enthusiastically support rights approaches. These are the groups that 
drove good governance movements against political machines in the United States and quality of life 
movements in Europe. Rights approaches attract middle sectors because they emphasise clean, 
transparent government that operates according to universal norms. 
Middle sectors attracted by the norms of rights based approaches offer an alternative set of authority 
figures, leadership skills, and organisational capacity. Traditional authorities kept poor clients in a 
dependent position within clientelist networks. Middle sectors can forge alliances with the poor through 
formal institutions. Participation and democratic practice offer opportunities for middle sectors and poor 
citizens to oppose traditional authorities. 
It is here that two continuing difficulties deserve to be raised with the rights-based approach. First, 
the universal appeal of rights-based approaches also makes it difficult to resolve issues of competing 
rights. In particular, rights approaches are not easily translated into attempts at redistribution that take 
from privileged groups to provide for the underprivileged. Poor and excluded citizens can legitimately 
argue that they face extra difficulties in realising rights, and they can demand a level playing field. They can 
also demand access to basic economic and social benefits as a minimal requirement for participation. On 
the other hand, rights-based approaches alone are difficult to use to justify preferential treatment or to 
resolve situations in which the rights of the privileged conflict with the rights of underprivileged. Thus, 
rights-based approaches could be used to overturn anti-minority, discriminatory laws in the United States, 
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but rights arguments could not sustain affirmative action policies that gave preferential treatment to 
minorities. Rights-based approaches are important in equalising access, but alone the}' are difficult to use 
to justify preferential treatment and redistributive outcomes. 
A second difficulty that deserves to be raised refers to potential difficulties created bv resource 
realities. In conditions of resource abundance, universal access and a minimal standard of well-being 
simply require raising the living standards of those who are excluded and no sacrifice is required on the 
part of others. Rights-approaches are sufficient to argue for this for many who are excluded. Yet, in 
resource scarce conditions, universal access and/or minimal standards are probably unobtainable; and 
many groups are excluded. Even if an effort is made to include new groups, some individuals will 
inevitably be excluded and/or denied minimal well-being. In these contexts, it is difficult to decide which 
groups to target. 
In response to both of these caveats, rights approaches emphasise changing the terms of who is 
included and excluded in defining rights themselves. Ideally, these issues could be overcome on an 
explicidy political and moral basis that privileges the rights of the poor, weak, and the excluded over the 
rich, powerful, and included (Sider 2003). At the heart of a rights-based approach are the power 
relationships, dvnamics, and structures that mediate the realisation of rights (Hughes et al. 2004). 
In practice, participation is central to achieving consensus for rights based approaches. Participatory 
methods offer a mechanism whereby individuals and interests can negotiate rights and deal with the 
thorny issues surrounding competing rights and resource scarcity. Through participation, actors negotiate 
their own understanding of rights in their local context. International and universalistic practices form the 
background for this negotiation, and local specificities and understandings are allowed to define the terms 
of rights. 
The ways in which participatory institutions are structured becomes central to power relationships. 
Participator}' institutions can be structured to privilege the participation of excluded groups and alliances 
between middle sectors and the poor. The way these groups are included will depend on local contexts 
and patterns of exclusion. Where women are traditionally excluded, as in India, democratic spaces can be 
reserved for them. Where indigenous citizens are excluded, meetings may be held in local languages, 
traditional dress allowed, and documents printed in indigenous languages. All of these steps have been 
taken in Peru, where many rural residents speak Aymara or Quechua as their first language. The impact of 
these institutional adjustments, sometimes minor, can enhance the ability of excluded groups to participate 
in the negotiation of rights. 
A rights-based approach brings together multiple strands of development thought and practice. It 
ties together notions of citizenship and well-being that provide a basis for advancing the cause of excluded 
groups. In addition, rights approaches emphasise participatory decision-making in which all citizens have 
access and equal voice. Of particular interest here, rights approaches emphasise accountable, participator}' 
authority that includes the poor as active citizens deciding their own development. This makes it possible 
to create an economic, cultural, and political alternative to clientelism. 
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Clientelism is resistant, and it remains prevalent in conditions of scarcity. Still, rights based 
approaches offer an opportunity to bring middle sectors and poor citizens together around universalistic 
rights, redistribution, and participatory democracy. 
Box 1 Transforming clientelism 
Challenges Poverty, inequality, and weak institutions 
Clientelist responses • Material resources, usually secured externally from wider patronage networks 
• Particularist distribution of material benefits to clients; and 
• Multistranded ties between patron and client that maintain order and limit client 
demands. 
Rights-based and 
pro-poor approach 
responses 
• Material resources secured through cross-class and cross-district alliances 
• Distribution of material benefits to the poor; and 
• Participatory mechanisms that resolve conflict and structure decisions in favour of 
poor rural citizens. 
International electoral assistance 
El Gol attempted to transform clientelist practices by introducing pro-poor and rights-based approaches. 
This was a significant departure from traditional elections assistance, which generally does not attempt a 
fundamental rearranging of power relations. In general, international electoral assistance focuses on free 
and fair elections in new democracies. In many of these countries authoritarian rule is a recent memory; 
political conflict takes occasionally violent forms; extreme poverty affects many; and institutional 
frameworks are extremely weak. As a result, assistance emphasises basic institutional strengthening, 
election-day monitoring, and international cooperation (Walker 2003). On these issues, the Peruvian 
experience strengthens and expands already existing knowledge. In addition, the Peruvian experience 
expands knowledge of appropriate interventions in contexts of weak parties, incipient democracy, fragile 
society, and pervasive clientelism. 
The international electoral assistance project that perhaps exhibits the most similarities to the 
Peruvian context occurred in Nigeria. In Nigeria, the transition to democratic rule that occurred in 1999 
left the country with a weak constitutional framework for elections.3 A national electoral commission and 
various state commissions were left the task of designing an electoral framework, including the timing of 
elections, the demarcation of boundaries, and the registration of voters and parties. Legislative, executive, 
and judicial pressures have been brought to bear on the commission, but still state election commissions 
were widely expected to manipulate upcoming local elections. 
Similar to Peru, some parts of Nigeria are resource rich. Yet, poverty is widespread, and parties fail to 
mobilise serious cleavages or organise programmatic debate. Instead, the "money politics" of powerful 
Many of these observations are drawn from comments by Sam Unom, DFID officer in Nigeria, and 
documents by Tim Sheehy and Victoria Erdoo-Ibi funded by DFID. 
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agents dominates local and national politics. Patrons with bountiful funds for campaign finance swing 
elections by distributing material benefits to buy votes or use repression to exclude participation. 
Electoral assistance has focused on institutional strengthening and has broadened to include election 
monitoring, citizen education, and partv-building. In these efforts, civil society organisations have been 
important collaborators. Still, the Nigerian case exemplifies the challenges faced in incipient democracies 
where institutional protections are weak, and powerful individuals and actors use wealth and institutional 
control to bias democratic outcomes. 
The Nigerian case brings up some of the most obvious parallels to rural Peru. Electoral assistance in 
such contexts can clearly not be limited to election-day observation and post-election evaluation, though 
both are important to nudging young democracies forward. Institutional development, party-building, and 
citizen education pose particular challenges to contexts in which democracy is recent, poverty is endemic, 
and parties and parts' systems do a poor job of linking state and society. In these contexts, international 
electoral assistance includes a pro-poor and party-building component. In the Peruvian context, this has 
included supporting efforts to build a rights-based and pro-poor orientation at the local level. 
What is unusual about Peru is that these ideals have partially transformed clientelist practices. The 
result has not been the complete elimination of clientelism, but rather the beginnings of an alternative. 
Persistent problems of resource scarcity and political informality remain and provide fertile ground for 
clientelism. In the paragraphs below, we examine the ways in which rights-based approaches have 
transformed structures on the ground in the context of electoral assistance. 
Section 3: Fieldwork 
Peru's context and existing challenges 
A real innovation is occurring in rural Peru. Old-style clientelist networks sustained unequal distribution of 
resources and traditional elite dominance but they were weakened by a decade of authoritarianism and 
political violence. Into the vacuum, movements in the rural Andes seized on rights-based approaches. 
They applied rights-based participation that transformed clientelist networks in ways that began to 
overcome opposition and generate pro-poor outcomes. 
This accomplishment is all the more remarkable given the conditions of rural Peru. The countryside, 
particularly the Andean region, remains poor and scarred by several decades of upheaval. In the late 
1960s, the Peruvian military seized power and imposed a land reform that displaced rural elites (Stepan 
1978). Most of them moved to Lima or provincial capitals and left behind rural municipalities where 
peasants lacked the capital or skill to sustain development. Many peasants migrated to cities, but a 
significant population settled into poverty and subsistence agriculture isolated from the rest of the 
country. Infrastructure remains poor and links to major urban centres are weak. The land in most of the 
Andean interior is rich in cultural heritage and panoramic vistas, but it has been forgotten by the state and 
remains destitute in quality of life. 
11 
After the military exited power in the 1970s, Leftist and popular movements eventually emerged in 
the Andean zones, but they were devastated by political violence. In places like Puno and Cusco, Leftist 
coalitions such as the United Left Front attempted to bring together various pro-poor forces in the 1970s 
and 1980s. Attacks from local elites in provincial centres weakened them, and defections to the national 
Centre-Left APRA party depleted their leadership. Eventually, the political forces that had begun to take 
shape during the 1980s were caught between radical Left guerrilla movements and an increasingly 
authoritarian state. The guerrillas attacked them for presenting an electoral alternative, and the state turned 
to traditional repressive mechanisms such as civil defence patrols and military abuses. 
Political society all but disappeared from rural Peru during the 1990s. Fujimori defeated the guerrillas 
and inflation, and he seized carte blanche to govern the country. To consolidate autonomous control, he 
closed parliament, persecuted political parties, and staged populist theatre and distribution to create a 
direct link between the presidency and a base of support (Levitsky 1999; Roberts 1995). He governed until 
2000, when his increasingly rigid and exclusionary regime eventually collapsed under the weight of 
corruption, political opposition, and economic stagnation. Fujimori fled to Japan, and he left behind a 
political elite and civil society that was fragmented and weak. 
New democratic impulses were released by the movement to remove Fujimori, and attention has 
slowly been turned to local level institutions. Under great expectations and uncertainty, the process of 
decentralisation in Peru is only just beginning. The system of subnational government includes 24 regions, 
and each is subdivided into numerous provinces. Provinces include various districts, with one district 
serving as the head of the province. Though the provinces and districts have held elections for the past 20 
years, regions are only just now renewing direct elections. Since 1990, regional authorities had been 
appointed by the central government and operated essentially as deconcentrated administrators for central 
bureaucracy. 
The 2002 elections themselves were held before the assignment of power and resources to local 
governments had been fully decided, and the law regulating regional presidents and councils was passed 
only days before the elections were held. 
Below the regional level, Peru's government structure includes a number of provinces. The structure 
of province governance is loosely comparable to a hub and spokes in which district heads are surrounded 
by several municipalities. The municipalities are generally rural and contain populations that range from a 
few hundred to several thousand. The district head is usually a slightly more urban centre which enjoys a 
larger budget, some additional responsibilities, and a mayor elected with votes from all communities in the 
district. Flectoral rules for legislative bodies at both the municipal and district level guarantee the party of 
the mayor an automatic majority. Opposition parties are guaranteed a minority presence. Despite 
representing the entire province, district mayors often spend their entire budget in the district head, and 
dispersed rural communities secure resources only by promising votes and obedience in the future. 
In terms of revenues, the only reliable autonomous funding at the local level is through central 
government revenue sharing and taxes on buildings, sen-ices, circulation, beer and tolls. Realistically, 
municipal administrations have extremely poor capacity- to collect taxes and largely depend on negotiated 
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(and politically-distributed) transfers from districts, regions, and the national government. Local 
governments control approximately 4 per cent of the national budget for 2004. Though they are scheduled 
to increase that participation to 7 per cent in the next year and 12 per cent by 2006, few are hopeful that 
such increases will materialise. To achieve the targeted percentages, the central government transfers a 
block grant (labelled FONCOMUN) totalling two per cent of sales taxes. This is distributed according to 
number of electors. In addition, earmarked grants are transferred for infrastructure projects implemented 
at the local level (FONCODES) and social programs (PRONA). 
Earmarked transfers are implemented on behalf of central ministries, and they are the currency of 
vertical political relations even todav. In the past, these were treated as patronage resources handed only to 
obedient municipalities bv the Ministry of the Presidency. Fujimori obtained maximum leverage during his 
regime by visiting tiny municipalities when projects were being implemented. Now, the social programmes 
have been grouped into development programmes managed by the Ministry of Women and Social 
Programmes, and political dynamics to securing transfers are not quite so explicit.5 Bureaucratic rules set 
the requirements for municipalities to qualify to receive funds. On the other hand, political networks 
creep back into the equation as the requirements of qualification remain unclear; most rural municipalities 
lack the administrative capacity to fulfil requirements; and frequent ministerial changes have limited the 
decentralisation process to a sporadic advance. 
In response, local units are attempting to develop newly discovered, autonomous political muscle. 
Family and social networks of migrants that have left the countryside and come to Lima and maintain 
links to the countryside provide an important constituency that pressures urban elites, bureaucrats, and 
representatives to favour their rural home municipalities. In addition, electoral laws shifted the national 
legislature from a single, national district to 2/3 regional districts and 1/3 from Lima. As a result, 
numerous ex-mayors from rural districts have now risen to national legislative prominence. These political 
realities help mayors from the local level to pressure for their share of transfers, but pressure remains 
informal and poorly regulated by bureaucratic rules or technical standards. 
The lack of formal mechanisms of political articulation from the local to the national level and the 
lack of capacity at the local level makes it relatively easy for jealous actors at the centre to delay or obstruct 
the transfer of resources and responsibilities. In particular, the political capacity to overcome exclusion is 
limited for rural jurisdictions and the people of the Andean highlands. Poverty, exclusion and national 
neglect have a long history, and the experience of the 1980s and 1990s created an institutional vacuum in 
the countryside that was like few other periods of Peruvian history. State and civil society had developed 
only destructive capacity to find and attack opposition, demobilise social movements, and distribute 
Several mayors complained about the size of their transfer. The number of electors, they claimed was often 
distorted by fraud, and certainly inaccurate as a result of high levels of migration. In particular, more urban 
municipalities faced high levels of in-migration that were not counted in distributing transfers. 
They have to qualify to receive the funds on the basis of capacity and training. Of 498 applications to obtain 
the guaranteed funds, 241 were processed in 2003. At regional level, 67 were approved out of 198 applications. 
Useful comments were provided by Martin Soto, an ex-advisor to the Decentralisation Committee and 
currendy a technocrat in the Women's and Development Ministry. 
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meaningless patronage. The degree of apathy, fear, and distrust among the population was severe. The 
only viable institutions were those that reasserted clientelism, and traditional authorities were quick to fill 
the political vacuum. 
In several of the communities where El Gol operated, these political realities were directly felt. In 
Haquira in Apurimac, Sendero Luminoso guerrillas killed two municipal workers in 1995. In Puno, 
government-organised civil defence patrols were associated with numerous violations of human rights, 
and one documented atrocity in which a young woman was raped. Organised civil society was seriously 
damaged. 
In most areas, clientelism is the only governance institution that operates. Resource scarcity, cultural 
exclusion, and weak formal political institutions characterise most districts. Traditional authorities 
maintain patron-client networks that resolve these problems while perpetuating inequality and the status 
quo. 
There were, of course, select individuals or organisations that surpassed these conditions. They 
generally mobilised neighbourhoods, communal associations, women's and peasant organisations, and the 
residue of Left party organisation. Still, such organisations were poorly linked across jurisdictions, and 
many rural communities lost their most dynamic members to migration to cities. 
The most successful alternative movements have been those that attempt to introduce pro-poor and 
rights-based approaches to governance offering pro-poor policies to address the needs of the poor 
majority. Rights-based approaches privilege the participation of the poor, prevent the intrusion of 
traditional patrons, and secure the support of external allies, especially activist civil society, such as NGOs, 
organised sectors, and the international community. 
El Gol approaches and entry-points 
El Gol electoral assistance operated in the ten-month period that led up to and followed the 2002 local 
and regional elections. The basic poverty, weakness of institutions and fragile civil society that 
characterised rural Peru meant that it was impossible to limit assistance to traditional election monitoring, 
observation and civic education. Prior experience with electoral assistance in Peru and collaborative 
discussions with local partners encouraged a more ambitious approach (see Table 1). Most of the 
incidence occurred at the local level, but additional interventions occurred for the regions. Also, both local 
and regional interventions included national lobbying to influence the institutional framework that 
governed the subnational level so as to shift more resources and responsibilities to local governments 
while institutionalising participatory planning institutions. The interventions promoted pro-poor policies 
through rights-based approaches, and were made in the five Andean regions, Apurimac, Ayacucho, Cusco, 
Huancavelica, and Puno. 
There are multiple ways in which to categorise El Gol activities. The parmers contracted to design 
and carry out projects included efforts at provincial and district level, interventions in public opinion and 
the media, and pressure for national legislation. The organisations were: Asociacion SER y Vicarias de 
Avaviri, Juli v Sicuani; Colectivo Ayacucho (IPAZ, CEPRODEP, CEDAP, CCC-UNCCH, Defensoria del 
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Pueblo, FEDECMA, SER, Solidaridad); Centro Bartolome de las Casas, ADEAS Qullana y CADEP Jose 
Maria Arguedas; Comite Multisectorial de Quispicanchi: Parroquia Santiago Apostol de Urcos; Asociacion 
de Comunicadores Sociales Calandria; TV Cultura; APRODEH. The following tables borrow from the 
original evaluation document from the project to describe the activities and geographic scope of the El 
Gol partners (Romero 2003). 
Table 1 El Gol partners 
Organisation Activities Coverage 
SER 
Vicars of the Southern Andes 
SEPAR, SISAY y CITAQ 
Strengthen links between state and 
society and participation in general. 
Puno 
Cusco 
Huancavelica 
Bartolome de las Casas Centre 
ADEAS Qullana 
CADEP 
Strengthen civil society, leaders, 
candidates, and elected authority. 
Apurimac (Grau and Cotabambas 
province) 
Cusco (Chumbivilcas province) 
Ayacucho Collective 
(IPAZ, CEDAP, CEPRODEP, CCC-
UNCCH, Defensoria del Pueblo, 
FEDECMA, SER, Solidaridad) 
Build civil society and candidate 
capacity for local governance. 
Ayacucho 
People's Defender Monitor and regulate free and fair 
elections with particular attention to 
the rights of the subordinate 
groups. 
Apurimac 
Ayacucho 
Cusco 
Huancavelica 
Puno 
Multisectoral Committee of 
Quispicanchi (Urcos Parish) 
Strengthen citizenship through 
training in rights and consultative 
planning committees. 
Cusco, Quispicanchi province 
RED Peru Strengthen citizen oversight, 
improve governance capacity 
through participatory planning, 
lobby central government for 
national legislation on local 
government. 
Apurimac 
TV Cultura Strengthen civil society capacity 
through television campaigns. 
Cusco, Puno, Ayacucho, 
Huancavelica, Apurimac 
Calandria 
Association of Social 
Communicators 
Strengthen media capacity to 
evaluate government and promote 
accountability. Support national 
legislation on local government. 
Cusco, Puno, Ayacucho, 
Huancavelica 
APRODEH Study perceptions of rights among 
citizens. 
Ayacucho, Cusco Huancavelica, 
Amazonas, Junfn 
SER Associaton Study perceptions and behaviour of 
local elites. 
Ayacucho y Cusco 
I PAZ Electoral ethnography on candidate 
perceptions of local and regional 
government. 
Ayacucho 
ONPE Essay competition on promoting 
rural political participation. 
National 
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The following sections examine the impact of El Gol at the different levels of subnational government. It 
would be impossible to expect a relatively short-term and recent electoral assistance programme to 
completely transform clientelism. Still, the report attempts to describe those changes that occurred in the 
context of a rights based approach to development. 
El Gol impact: regions 
The story of new democratic authority in the regions is a story of struggle for rights and pro-poor policies. 
This struggle is shaped by the nature of local authority and the reality of social forces on the ground, in 
which El Gol played a small, but important role. 
Developing regional participatory institutions 
Elections occurred simultaneously for district, province, and regional authorities in 2002. The shorter 
history of democratic practice at the regional level meant that elections to regional authorities did not lead 
to a flowering of local and popular demands and organisation. Instead, traditional elites entered as 
democratic competitors and have largely reasserted their authority. Regional elections were won by 
established national organisations that formed alliances with local elites; APRA won twelve regions, and a 
coalition of Centrist interests, Somos Peru, won another seven. A few innovative and alternative 
candidates emerged, such as the president elected in Chiclayo, who had been a Leftist leader persecuted 
under the Fujimori regime. 
In general, the operation of parties at the regional level is particularly weak. National parties identify 
candidates by looking for local notables, especially those who are easily purchased with resources from 
central ministries. In turn, regional elites build support by peppering the local level with projects in 
exchange for support from local leaders. Rarely are regional-local alliances formed before elections, nor 
are they based on anything like ideology or a developmental plan for the region.6 
In general, civil society at the regional level is too weak to oppose these practices. Voters emerging 
from a decade of weak parties, political violence, and little memory of regional authority elections were 
understandably unconnected to new regional governments. Programmatic messages had litde resonance, 
and traditional elites could mobilise shallow appeals to win most of the regional presidencies in 2002. 
I.ocal elites in Puno, for example, articulated historical animosities to central dominance and built an 
electoral victory out of the strategic application of public resources to reward supporters and punish 
enemies around a Puneno identity movement (Diez Flurtado 2003: 84—6). 
The struggle at regional level in Puno is a microcosm of the rest of Peru's regions. Notable families 
had long ago migrated to coastal and urban centres, pushed out during the 1970s land reforms and the 
politically violent 1980s and 1990s. Behind them, they left intermediate elites, owners of medium sized 
properties and the occupants of upper middle class, bureaucratic and commercial positions. Middle 
Interview with Congressman Walter Alejos, member of the Committee on Regionalization and 
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sectors eventually built their own networks that dominated regional politics, generated leaders, formed 
alliances, and distributed patronage. By and large, these newly dominant classes bridged urban and familial 
networks, opening slighdv from the white-only dominance that existed earlier but still far from including 
the indigenous peasants that occupy the rural highlands. 
Subordinate sectors in Puno are slowly developing new avenues of social mobility, and they draw 
representatives from educated peasants and a loose gathering of NGO, university, neighbourhood, work, 
and Church networks. They have been able to build pro-poor movements that gained footholds at the 
province and district level, but they have failed to break through to the regions. At regional level, pro-poor 
movements have few allies. 
Still, a legal loophole creates room for opposition movements to attack corrupt administrators. After 
the first year in office, legal rules allow a recall vote on authorities, and many opposition movements are 
taking advantage of the opportunity to attempt to unseat traditional elites. The confrontations were just 
taking shape in early 2004, but it appeared that several provincial presidents, including the president of 
Puno, faced real challenges. For the time being, it is unlikely that such movements will significandy change 
provincial authority, especially because the replacements would be drawn from the same middle sector 
family elites. Still, this represents an attempt to attack patrons operating through traditional clientelist 
practices. 
A more surreptitious attempt to shift the structure of power at regional level in Puno may rest in the 
Concertation Board. The Board is a representative body of 73 members, including provincial mayors, 
NGOs and Church authorities. These actors have used the Board to influence development plans for the 
region, in particular to pressure the regional government in the use of its substantial inter-province 
development budget (Diez Hurtado 2003: 74). Like other instances of semi-direct participation, the Board 
supports privileged access for entities representing subordinate groups. 
In particular, newly-elected province mayors have been using the Board to expose and transform 
traditional clientelist practices of the regional president. Large intra-district infrastructure projects, partly 
financed by the region, are important sources of jobs and patronage, as well as regional development. 
Also, emergency funds for natural disasters are usually channelled through regional governments before 
reaching the local level. Regional governments traditionally use them to favour obedient provincial 
mayors. Through the Board, provincial mayors have pressured to receive compensation for dislocations 
caused by large projects, such as the Trans-Oceanic Highway, and to oversee the distribution of 
emergency funds. The mayors have used the funds they secure to target rural and poor districts of their 
provinces. In essence, they have seized control of traditional patronage funds and redirected them to their 
own priorities. 
Creating a national framework for regional governance 
El Gol has contributed to these efforts to widen access at the regional level and strengthen the voice of 
pro-poor mayors in bodies like the Concertation Board. Partners within the El Gol Project, SER and the 
Church-based NGOs, worked with pro-poor mayors in Puno and sponsored formal associations of 
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mayors (RED Peru, REMURPE) that operated at regional and nadonal level. RED Peru held regional 
meetings of mayors in Puno and Apurimac that attracted 22 representadves of rural municipalities. These 
meetings were articulated upwards to a national meeting of rural mayors that took place in Lima with 
representatives of 83 municipalities from several regions. In the absence of national parties that bring local 
mayors together, such associations are probably the only way in which they can coordinate to influence 
higher level bodies such as the Puno Concertation Board. 
The Concertation Board emerged early in Puno and the Paniagua provisional government that 
followed Fujimori established a Board to coordinate poverty efforts in each region. Prior to the 2002 
elections, El Gol partners worked to shape the national legislation that would regulate these regional 
boards. As a body that offers preferential access to civil society actors, the Boards potentially created a 
counterweight to the traditional elites dominant at the regional level. In Lima, El Gol partners worked to 
introduce legislation that would require all regions to constitute a similar, consultative body with 
preferential access for representatives of subordinate groups. The Organic Law of Regions that was 
undergoing discussion in the national legislature offered a convenient opportunity. This law established 
elections, fiscal power, and planning responsibilities for regional authorities, and stipulated increased 
revenue sharing and authority for regions as competences for additional policy areas were transferred. 
El Gol partners, particularly Calandria, REMURPE and RED Peru, worked to shape the Regional 
Organic Law. They sought contacts with legislative assistants who were active in the committees that were 
considering the law. Most were extremely satisfied with the technical competence with which the law was 
discussed, and HI Gol lobbying was considered an important part of sustaining the technical rigor. The 
law also included a caveat to strengthen political coordination across regions that requires that parties have 
at least 50 activists in 70 per cent of the provinces or 2/3 of the regions. 
The impact of El Gol partners was most evident in the requirements for a consultative body that 
would include representatives of civil society, the Regional Coordinating Councils (CCR). Like the 
Concertation Board in Puno, the CCR would include representatives of regional government, local 
government, and civil society. In particular, civil society was to include registered entities that numbered at 
least 40 per cent of the membership. The bodies would operate by consensus, and they would be able to 
approve and monitor fiscal and development plans for the regions. 
In sum. El Gol assistance involved bottom-up efforts to strengthen institutions and society at the 
regional level. Also, partners worked at the centre to build a legal framework for the periphery. 
El Gol impact: local level 
As in the regions, El Gol assistance at the local level included bottom-up and centre-periphery elements. 
At local level. El Gol partners worked with officials, candidates, civil society actors, and journalists. In 
Interview with Congressman Walter Alejos, member of the Committee on Regionalization and 
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Lima, El Gol partners helped shape the institutional framework that governed municipalities. The 
backdrop to these national and local efforts was the movements and efforts that were already underway 
on the ground. 
Forging intra-locai alliances and cooperation 
An intriguing movement is underway to strengthen local administrative capacity. Several local mayors 
found that alone they lacked the resources and expertise to tackle complicated administrative tasks. 
Instead, they sought mechanisms to join administrative forces and resources. Several factors made such 
cooperation more likely. 
In Huancavelica and Cusco regions, municipalities are joined by topographical coincidence. They 
have to overcome multiple factors that militate against cooperation, such as differing regional authorities, 
altitudes at or above 3,000 meters, high rates of poverty, and dispersed populations. Still, several 
municipalities found themselves linked by geography, specifically a river that began in snow-topped peaks 
and sliced through each province. This shared river resource gave them an automatic mechanism to 
coordinate and cooperate. Downstream municipalities tended to enjoy slightly better land and conditions, 
but they depended on upstream municipalities to not overuse the river for irrigation or pollute the waters. 
The mayors of the different municipalities sought coordinating mechanisms to govern river water, and 
this cooperation spilled over into shared administrative capacity to pursue inter-jurisdiction infrastructure 
such as roads. One example was the San Antonio River Association (AMSAT) and another was growing 
around the River Cusco. Other organisations that operate around shared topographic or geographic 
characteristics are ANMIN (Association of Municipalities Affected by Mining) and an association of 
coastal municipalities that replaces an organisation Fujimori eliminated during his regime. 
An additional input to collaboration among local units was the political leadership provided by 
individual mayors. This leadership was partiy charismatic, as it was clear that certain mayors enjoyed the 
respect of their fellows. In general, such mayors had a political history, and they had attained office in the 
provincial head. For example, Michel Portier, mayor of Macusani, provincial head of Carabaya in Puno, 
was a Frenchman, naturalised Peruvian, who had spent years working with the pro-poor Catholic Church 
and running a radio show in the highlands. His following was related to the notoriety he commanded as a 
result of radio fame, and his outsider status and years of experience in pro-poor movements gave him 
legitimacy in the eyes of voters sick of corrupt patrons linked to the Fujimori regime. 
Portier, like other savvy district leaders, did not rest only on the appeal of charisma. He used his 
slighdy larger district budget to purchase support among the mayors in the districts that fell within 
Carabaya province. He promised to share 100,000 soles with each of the mayors that agreed to implement 
a participatory decision-making process in their districts, and he sent a technical advisor from his staff to 
The Mayor of Anta explained the role of water in driving cooperation, "The river is our life. It provides water 
to irrigate, drink, and build. But it comes from uphill polluted, and we pass it along even more polluted. To 
clean will cost 5500,000, which is beyond what any of us alone could afford." 
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help put the process in place. He is also using his administrative staff to assist district-member 
municipalities to meet the qualification requirements for receiving transfers of social programmes from 
the central government. 
Portier also cooperated with six other districts to lobby for preferential treatment with respect to 
electric power. The San Gaban dam, which provides power for much of the region, is located in 
neighbouring Ollachea, and Portier and other neighbouring districts collaborated to pressure national and 
regional government for compensation based on their contribution to the national power grid. Each 
district received a small sum, and the collaboration has continued. 
One output of the collaboration has been an effort to obtain emergency funds for natural disasters 
that had struck the region. The funds were transferred from the centre to the region, but appeared to get 
stalled in regional government channels. Portier and his allies argued, successfully, that an investigation 
was necessary and both the regional and the national legislatures undertook investigations of the misuse of 
these emergency funds. 
Creating a national framework for local governance 
The El Gol project shaped the possibility for these kinds of inter-jurisdiction collaboration in its Lima-
based work.9 As in the case of the regions, an Organic Law of the Municipalities was under discussion in 
the national legislature. Though the Local Government Committee that reported the law included several 
ex-mayors, they were not necessarily favourable to pro-poor movements at the local level. They were, 
however, open to pressure from public opinion. 
HI Gol partners sought alliances with actors in Congress and other civil society organisations. Key 
activists, such as ex-politicians with access to colleagues, mobilised their networks, and skilled technocrats 
facilitated passage. To secure multiparty support, they bargained support for the Regional Organic Law, in 
which one party held a particular interest, in exchange for special attention to rural areas in the 
Municipality Law, in which another party had an interest.10 The political dynamics of regional-local 
decisions were shaped in part by the fact that the president's own parts', Peru Posible, had won only one 
regional presidency but had important local support. El Gol partners entered the fray by tying the laws 
rhetorically to the overall process of democratisation. Thev framed decentralisation as an aspect of 
democratisation, making it extremely difficult for legislators, many of whom had suffered under 
authoritarianism, to oppose. When debate in the committees would stall, the NGO activists with links to 
the media would publicise the issue of rural municipalities and bring the debate back to public attention. 
Though the immediate local efforts did not explicidv encourage inter-municipal cooperation, the actual work of 
partners made such cooperation likely. Partners often treated districts within a province as units and built 
cooperation in collaborative training and assistance. Also, thev worked explicidy to offer resources and facilities 
to one inter-district association, AMSAT, whose leader had been the mayor of Haquira and worked closelv with 
El Gol partners. 
Much of this discussion comes from interviews with participants in the lobbying efforts, including Julio Diaz 
Palacios (ex-Mayor, ex-Congressman, current activist in Network of Local Agenda, the Network of Peruvian 
Local Development, and the Ecological Movement). 
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These techniques and strategies made it possible to shape some of the provisions in the law. In 
particular, El Gol partners sought special provisions in the law that would support a development role for 
government at the local level. Most municipalities were primarily service providers that did little more than 
wedding certificates and garbage collection. In rural areas particularly, additional attention was needed for 
issues such as employment and growth. Several decrees modified the law to give special preference to 
rural areas through more flexible administrative arrangements, a link between mining taxes and rural 
municipality revenues, and a development plan specifically for rural municipalities. 
The flexibility in administration may prove to be key in encouraging the cross-jurisdictional alliances 
mentioned above. The law allows municipalities to join their administrations for development 
programmes, and in particular, they will be able to collaborate in seeking the technical capacity required to 
receive the transfers of funds and responsibilities of social programmes from the Ministry of Women and 
Social Programmes. 
An additional stipulation of the Organic Laws was a permanent call for popular participation through 
Local Coordination Councils (CCL). Like the regional CCR, the CCL includes mayors of the districts, 
council-people, and 40 per cent civil society representation. The CCL operate through consensus and 
produce a development plan and a participatory budget that are communicated to the municipal council. 
This participatory mechanism was a hard-fought advance that had to be inserted after the law had 
left committee. It took explicit bargaining to introduce, and the president exerted his own pressure by 
refusing to sign the law until amendments had addressed 33 executive observations related to participation 
and other details. The results of the bargaining lead some observers to consider the municipal law more 
technically watered-down than the regional law. Still, for politicians and activists convinced of the efficacy 
of civil society participation, the Organic Law of Municipalities was an important step forward. 
The Lima debate over the participatory institutions made one aspect of participation clear — its appeal 
to urban and middle classes. The appeal for the rural poor was also evident, and will be covered below. 
For actors within the Lima-based (and regional capital) NGOs and their international donors, 
participator}' decision-making was ideologically consistent with rights-based approaches. 
By making participation a central plank in the national legislation and local government, El Gol 
partners (many of whom were drawn from middle class, urban NGOs) created an explicit link between 
sectors of the urban middle class and their rural, poor counterparts. National legislators perceived this 
link. Congressman Ernesto Herrera had been a mayor and he recognised the utility of using participation 
to build cross-class and cross-regional coalitions, 'Participation encourages public-mindedness among the 
citizens. Those with some wealth can see what the poor want, and they can accept dividing the resources 
because decisions are made openlv and in a participatory way'. For urban middle-classes, participation 
increases confidence that local, rural institutions can be trusted with increased resources and power. 
Empowering local civil society 
In addition to the Lima work, a direct impact of El Gol was felt in the municipalities themselves. An 
important component of the project focused on civil society at the local level. Partners in Lima, regional 
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capitals, and rural districts designed projects to work direcdy with actors in civil society and the media. 
Calandria, a Lima-based NGO with significant experience in working with the media that supported 
journalists during the election campaign and distributed materials throughout the regions in local 
languages. Journalists received training in evaluating electoral promises and development plans; and, after 
the elections, they were trained to expose corruption. Most journalists were poor, with only basic 
education, in fact largely moonlighting as journalists. To gain access to radio, most had to pay for time and 
only those with support from NGOs or the Church could reasonably expect sustained radio time. There 
was a wide variety in capacity across the regions, pardy varying within regions by proximity to regional 
capitals. Puno, Huancavelica and Cusco had a number of quality journalists; while particularly violent 
attacks had eliminated or intimidated the most capable media actors in places such as Ayacucho. In a few 
cases, journalists used the media to gather a following and later pursue public office. 
In the regions, local NGOs, associations and activists formed partnerships with Calandria and other 
HI Gol actors to assist media effectiveness. ADEAS Qullana, CBC and CADEP worked in Chumbivilcas 
district of Cusco and Cotabambas, Grau and Canchis in Apurimac. These distant provinces were eight 
hours into the mountainous Andean region and were hit particularly hard by the violence of the 1990s. 
Activities in the provinces included training for local activists who then replicated the training in various 
communities. Discussions with the activists revealed a sincere dedication to community organising, 
though it was clear that the wages paid were only barely enough to preserve their interest. 
Many of the activists were also radio personalities. Paulina had come from the small community of 
Colquemarca in Cusco. She explained that her biggest accomplishment had been convincing the parties 
not to put women at the lowest position on partv ballots. She cajoled and exposed manoeuvres by the 
parties, and there are now women representatives on all the municipal councils. She explained her role as 
gadfly to the new government. 'Some of the communities still operate with a blindfold. They sell their 
vote for one sol . . . Some candidates made dumb proposals in the debates. One attacked the other 
candidates for being indigenous, and then made silly, unspecific proposals. The lack of parties confused 
voters, but 1 tried to explain who were the social candidates we could trust and who were the mistis who 
came from the city and would not keep their promises'. 
The Id Gol capacity-building efforts with civil society had created a web of journalists and 
community leaders who were eager to press a rights-based and pro-poor approach. Interestingly, this 
coincided with the efforts of local authorities who were seeking to embed their authority. 
Transforming local authorities 
In general, HI Gol partners worked to encourage local authorities to pursue a rights-based and pro-poor 
approach to governance. The HI Gol partners worked direcdy with candidates prior to the elections and 
with officials following the elections. In particular they attempted to alter local authority mentality through 
training and education campaigns, as well as create institutions and mechanisms of accountability that 
could operate at the local level. 
The tasks were not easy, but El Gol partners could take advantage of local political realities. Mavors 
in districts and provinces have to balance their appeal to secure election. Bv including candidates for their 
ticket with different popular bases, candidates could enhance their vote. Thus, for the rurally based mayor 
of Anta province, it made sense for him to include council-member candidates from the urban centre 
where his support was weaker. Similarly, the urban-based mayor from Ollachea district included a council-
member from the rural community of Azaroma. These electoral realities created opportunities for El Gol 
partners to pressure and encourage the inclusion of candidates from traditionally marginalised, poor 
communities. Another electoral reality- that El Gol could exploit was the requirement that party lists 
include women. El Gol trained women candidates and civil society activists to demand that women appear 
high on party lists, as opposed to at the bottom. 
El Gol programmes were unlikely to change long-standing corrupt practices, but several institutional 
innovations may lead to improvements. Partners worked with candidates and officials prior to the 
elections to encourage movement away from traditionally corrupt campaign practices. Workshops with 
candidates in Huancavelica, Puno, Ayacucho and Cusco trained candidates in making programmatic 
appeals during election campaigns. In addition, candidates were invited to public debates in the town 
centre, and candidates were asked to prepare a platform and sign a governance agreement. In Cotabambas 
and Chumbivilcas provinces in Cusco, over 40 community meetings introduced proposals to candidate 
planning platforms and were then incorporated into budgets once candidates were elected. 
In addition to liaising with candidates during the campaigns, El Gol partners worked with the elected 
officials once in office. Officials were trained in participatory budgeting, including 11 provinces in Cusco 
and over 275 participants in Ayacucho, where partners supported officials in the skills required. In 
Quispicanchi, Cusco, citizens were organised into vigilance committees to oversee project implementation 
by newly elected authorities. 
The political and fiscal impact of these practices can be seen in Carabaya province in Puno. Elected 
officials sought El Gol partner assistance (particularly SER) to assist in designing a new allocation of 
resources for their first year in office. Open town meetings were held, and the allocations that the 
outgoing mayor had left were re-examined and readjusted to better meet citizen demands. Instead of 
spending on visible, urban projects, like repaying the plaza, the mayor preferred to direct resources to 
social programmes and rural communities. He held participatory meetings to discuss and reformulate the 
budget. 
Interestingly, participation did not immediately redirect resources the way officials had planned. The 
allocation that had absorbed most of public spending was a coliseum for 8,000 people (in a town of 
6,000). The participatory meeting managed to cut the stadium allocation somewhat, and the funds 
liberated were largely directed towards health and education. These were priorities of the province, but the 
reallocation included bulky investments (water tank for the hospital and computers for the schools) that 
may not have fit within the budget. It was clear to most observers that the redirection of resources was 
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significantly due to the skilful organisation and dominant oratory of the teachers association and the 
professional medical staff. They enjoyed prestige in the community, especially in the urban sector, and 
they could sway the participatory debate. 
As a result, for the following year, El Gol partners worked with the mayor to reorganise budgeting to 
weaken organised interests in the district head. For 2004, 40 per cent of the budget was allocated to the 
rural districts, half to provincial head priorities, and 10 per cent to inter-district projects. In each rural 
community, meetings determined the allocation of the territorial funds. Organised sectors like the teachers 
association protested, but they found that their support in the provincial head had been gready decreased. 
By 2004, the budget was completely different than that inherited in 2002. In the first year, the 
participatory budget process had shifted priorities away from the traditional clientelist projects left by the 
outgoing administration; in the next year, the administration took on a different opposition, the urban 
professionals. By reorganising budget institutions, the administration imposed a new set of pro-poor 
priorities in the budget as well as building a rural support base that could counter-balance organised 
interests. 
The keys to this switch were institutional rules that secured elite compliance while at the same time 
guaranteeing entitlements to poor citizens. A similar pattern emerged in Santo Tomas district in Cusco. In 
the past, local elites had been afraid to invest because the town was constandy torn by violence between 
urban and rural elites. Now, participatory planning offered a way to setde differences. The priorities that 
emerged avoided conflict between different elite interests and also included a pro-poor distribution as a 
result of a formula for project allocation. Projects received more resources if they (1) created work, 
(2) reached many beneficiaries, and (3) reached places where public works did not already exist. The result 
was that public investment targeted poor neighbourhoods and rural communities without creating 
additional conflict among the elite. 
In sum, El Gol interventions at the local level included centre-periphery efforts to reform the 
national legal framework for local government. It also included bottom-up efforts create competent civil 
society voices in the media and rights-based and pro-poor local government authorities. 
Comparing El Gol and non-El Gol districts 
After several visits to municipalities, interviewing El Gol partners, and discussions with officials, we 
decided to run an experiment to evaluate the Fd Gol programme and the nature of political development 
in the municipalities. Our experiment compared El Gol and non-El Gol districts. Obviously, the 
experiment did not occur in a controlled environment, and it is difficult to determine what responses truly 
mean, especially for an outsider that speaks only Spanish, not the indigenous languages (mosdy Quechua) 
spoken by some of the poorest members of the communities visited. In addition, one cannot be sure 
whether El Gol caused, or encouraged, changing political patterns, or whether the communities and El 
Gol partners self-selected each other based on prior links. Still, interesting trends were evident. Authorities 
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were conscious of the utility of participation as a mechanism to organise and incorporate supporters and 
they were also keenly aware of the necessity of structuring participation to manage demands in ways that 
directed resources to the poorest citizens. 
Four communities were chosen on the basis of discussions with El Gol partners. Two districts near 
Cusco (Anta, Tambobamba) and two districts in Puno (Macusani, Ollachea) were selected. The districts 
shared basic economic and demographic characteristics and all were located in the Andean highlands 
where poverty is acute and political violence directlv experienced. In each region, there was one district 
that had participated in El Gol (Tambobamba and Macusani) and one province that had not (Anta and 
Ollachea). The design allows us to control as many similarities as possible while attempting to measure the 
impact of El Gol. 
Table 2 District demographics (percentages) 
Population 
estimate 
2002 
(number) 
Lack 
basic 
needs 
Illite-
rate 
over 15 
Lack 
sewerage 
Malnourish-
ed, 1st year 
of school 
Agriculture 
work 
Rural 
Anta 20153 88.5 25.9 81.7 65.7 66.3 68.9 
Tambobamba 12809 98.9 60.7 97.6 77.5 84.6 72.5 
Macusani 11434 81.1 29.8 71.4 63 44.9 40.0 
Ollachea 3936 90.2 43.6 82.1 72.8 81.5 64.5 
Source: Banco de Informacion Distrital (2004). 
Anta was the most urbanised of the provinces visited, and it showed all the signs of a small town that was 
rapidly growing. It is 30 minutes from Cusco, connected by a paved highway and strong links. Many 
people work in Cusco and return to Anta where there is a bustling commercial centre. Despite this urban 
head, the population remains largely rural, and even those living in the centre retain land or conduct 
seasonal work in rural areas. There are nine districts and the Cusco River provides the main source of 
irrigation. Most land is held in small plots and production is for subsistence, though some production for 
Cusco markets occurs. 
By contrast, Tambobamba is a relatively urban centre located several hours from Cusco by difficult 
roads over mountainous terrain. The province is officially in Apurimac province, though it is better 
connected to Cusco. The districts in the province are located at varying altitudes, with some as high as 
4,000 meters and none lower than 2,500. Farmers at the higher altitudes face extremely harsh conditions 
where only subsistence and simple livestock are possible. In the valleys, more extensive herding and 
irrigation are possible, though not widely spread. 
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Macusani lies in the northeastern portion of Puno, just in the shadows of the snow-topped peak of Allun 
Capac. The land is rocky and the climate harsh, and most of the rural communities are dedicated to 
subsistence farming and livestock. Some of the more distant districts lie in the fertile jungle that begins as 
soon as the altitude begins to drop, but these are sparsely populated and poorly connected. Mining 
companies are increasingly interested in some of these zones where precious metals are thought to lie. 
Map 4 Macusani 
Reproduced by kind permission of Instituto Nacional de Estadistica y Informatica (www.inei.gob.pe). 
Ollachea lies just beyond Macusani on the trans-oceanic highway that links Peru and Brazil. Unlike the 
other districts, Ollachea is not a district head, and its population is significantly smaller. Most of the 
population live in the rocky hills above the town, and the distinctive characteristic of Ollachea is the San 
Gaban river that slices through the hills to create the steep slopes that nestle the small urban 
concentration. The frequent rumbling of trucks ratdes the settlement, and a commercial life has sprung 
around services for the passing truckers. The major source of dynamism (and destruction) is the huge 
hydroelectric plant that lies a few kilometres below the town. Construction of the plant involved 3,000 
workers, who descended on the town from 1998 until 2000. A commercial boom ensued, but so did 
violence, inflation, prostitution, and a host of social problems associated with abandoned children and 
mothers. The dam is currendy self-contained and interacts little with the community, even supplying food 
for its kitchen from distant markets. The town is currently engaged in a lawsuit that seeks property tax 
from the company that runs the plant. If successful, the suit would secure four times the annual budget. 
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The plant has clearly shattered the community, and it is doubtful that local authorities could resist if the 
plant owners decided to increase their political activism. Some evidence of future possibilities was evident 
in the behaviour of the outgoing mayor. Just after losing the election, he repealed the property tax and 
settled for a truck instead. When the new mayor announced a lawsuit to secure back taxes, the company 
reneged on the truck. 
Map 5 Ollachea 
Reproduced by kind permission of Instituto Nacional de Estadistica y Informatica (www.inei.gob.pe). 
These details should make it clear that all provinces in Peru have qualitative specificities that make them 
unique. The basic similarities they share are rural and poor with weak formal institutions and civil societies 
decimated by violence. These basic similarities are borne out in the socio-demographic details included 
below. Macusani was slightly more urbanised than the other districts, and Ollachea significantly smaller in 
population, but the basic poverty of rural highlands life are clear from the statistics. 
Respondents in each district included mayors and members of the city council; and in one district, 
members of the executive bureaucracy participated. The total number of respondents was 45, and all 
districts had at least 10 respondents. In each district, we read a series of paired comparisons, and those 
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present were asked to vote which of the two priorities they preferred. The paired comparisons included 
four options (jobs, product prices and infrastructure, basic services, and participator)' planning). There 
were six pairs (jobs-prices, jobs-services, etc)." 
We selected these items to trigger certain kinds of cleavage within the districts. 'Jobs' reflected the 
real need for immediate material benefits. 'Prices' reflected the needs of poor, rural producers for longer-
term material benefits. 'Sen-ices' were required by all citizens, but one might expect them to be especially 
appreciated in the long-term by urban sectors. 'Participation' reflected a rights-based approach to 
development. Obviously, the indicators offer only loose measures of the underlying concepts, but the 
experiment required surprisingly little explanation. The respondents quickly grasped what they were being 
asked to compare, and it was evident from their comments afterwards that they were making urban-rural, 
short-long term, and participation-material comparisons in considering their answers. 
The process was explained at the outset, and respondents were presented the paired comparisons 
with as litde definition of the priorities as possible. Explanations of the priorities were offered when 
asked, and some respondents attempted to provide their own definitions either during or after the vote. 
Respondents were asked to vote, explain their vote, and then vote again. A discussion followed. 
Section 4: Findings 
Some real changes are occurring at the local and regional level in Peru. The following paragraphs describe 
findings from each level of the study, with particular attention to advances and remaining concerns. The 
section begins with observations drawn from the district experiment. 
Comparing El Gol and non-El Gol districts: findings 
Several basic trends were evident in the voting and discussion of the experiment. Generally, the second 
vote intensified the preferences from the first vote; those who held dissenting opinions were cajoled or 
convinced that they should switch. Also, political dynamics and cleavages were made clear. Most 
communities are split between several elite factions. The electoral system gave the mayor an automatic 
majority in the town council, and those in the governing coalition generally looked to the mayor before 
deciding what they would vote. The opposition generally included at least one member of the local elite 
linked to the departed Fujimori regime. 
The results reported in Table 3 indicate the average of the two votes. The quantitative rankings of 
priorities offer an indication of the difference between El Gol districts and non-El Gol districts. 
Respondents in El Gol provinces appeared to favour long-term, rural and participation priorities. 
Respondents in non-El Gol provinces appeared to favour short-term, urban and material projects. 
Before turning to the qualitative comments that enlivened and deepened the experiment, it is useful 
to note the degrees and kinds of differences between El Gol and non-El Gol districts. The clearest 
distinction was in participation, which the respondents from El Gol districts showed a clear preference for 
11 Details on the methodology can be found in Appendix 1. 
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(76 per cent) and they almost doubled the preference for pardcipadon in the non-El Gol districts (39 per 
cent). Long-term projects were also preferred in the El Gol districts (64 per cent) though the preference 
was not so intense and the difference with non-El Gol districts not as significant (44 per cent). Finally, 
urban preferences were slightly more prevalent in the El Gol districts, though opinions were virtually split 
(56 per cent) and the difference may not be large enough to determine a difference from the non-El Gol 
districts (45 per cent). 
Table 3 Percent support for priorities 
El Gol districts 
(Carabaya, Tambobamba) 
Non-El Gol districts (Anta, 
Ollachea) 
Long-term more important than 
short-term 
64% 44% 
Urban more important than rural 56% 45% 
Participation more important than 
material 
76% 39% 
Respondents (2 rounds of voting) 24 21 
It is difficult to interpret a blunt instrument like this experiment when the task is to measure complex 
preferences of district authorities. One interpretation that has to be considered is that El Gol districts had 
learned to say what they think external observers like to hear, 'Participation is a fundamental right . . . 
Through participation we think about long-term, development priorities' etc. Contradictions and 
clarifications that emerged in qualitative comments suggest that this is pardv what was occurring; elected 
officials are savvy communicators, especially when they know that people with links to international 
donors are in the room. Still, the quantitative results at least suggest that El Gol districts differ from 
districts where El Gol projects did not operate. More ambitiously, it appears that El Gol local authorities 
were convinced of the potential of participation to open space for citizen rights while at the same time 
structuring decisions to achieve pro-poor policies. The qualitative comments that followed the votes 
offered an even more clear indication. 
In El Gol districts, there was a clear understanding of the role of participation in articulating rights 
and biasing outcomes towards pro-poor policies. The mayor in Macusani was explicit in linking 
participation to rights and pro-poor policy. 
Mayors used to budget as they wished. They did not tell anyone about the works, the salaries, or the 
costs of anything . . . The result was that all the projects went to the urban centre . . . Now, the 
motivation and the point of participation is to send money to the poor rural communities. 
The mayor from Tambobamba echoed the pro-poor potential of participator}' planning. 
Before, you could pick up a rock and money from Fujimori would be underneath. The problem was 
that people did not choose the projects and help to build them. Thev may not have even addressed 
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people's real needs. After the project was done, it just sat there and deteriorated. Now, people believe 
in the projects and put in their own money and sweat to make sure that the projects are successful. 
In Macusani, the mayor also exhibited a sophisticated understanding of participation and rights, though he 
was not idealistic about it. 
Still, everyone is jumping at the chance to participate, and this can create problems, as there are too 
many pent-up demands to satisfy, especially for a poor municipality . . . The territorial division of 
participation here privileges the rural communities and makes it difficult for the traditional families 
and urban interests to dominate decisions. 
The council members reinforced these impressions from the mayors. One woman council-member from 
Tambobamba explained the way in which participation had altered traditional clientelism to a more rights-
based and pro-poor system. 
Before, people who campaigned would give food, promise work, and spend money on beer and t-
shirts. They even used municipal funds for this, and then they did not keep their promises . . . I won 
because I listened to their demands. The participatory planning lets people decide what works are 
coming and encourages them to make popular contributions. This is what it means to be a citizen -
to participate, make demands, and take responsibility for the job. 
Another Tambobamba councilperson described the potential political utility of participation. 
Participation is popular because it is new. Also, it draws on a long history, in which the community 
provided work to build things like a temple during a faena. The key thing that participation does is 
build leaders. Women, in particular, are traditionally excluded. They can be encouraged to participate 
by involving them in the decisions that are meaningful: the glass of milk programme for kids, the 
women's committee for deciding on a community centre. Women need to be given the chance and 
training to develop as leaders. It used to be that being the leader of a community was a punishment 
or people voted for whoever gave them beer or food. Only the mistis or people with land 
participated. Now, everybody demands their rights. 
In Macusani, the mavor recognised the importance of short-term work in helping citizens alleviate 
poverty, especially in vulnerable moments of emergency. Previously, such jobs had been a familiar 
instrument to reassert traditional clientelist relationships. He introduced a more rights-based and pro-poor 
element by using participation. 
It used to be that you had to ask the mayor for a favour when your crops failed and he would give 
you a job. Me, I divide the jobs into one-month posts. Most of them are unskilled things like cleaning 
public spaces and such. I tell the Women's Neighbourhood Committee and the Association of 
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Mothers, This is how many jobs there are, who needs them?' They decide how to share the jobs, and 
they almost always share them equally and especially with the poorest women . . . Now, I can count 
on them whenever I need something in the community done. 
Similarly, the mayor of Macusani recognised the utility of reaching out to other subgroups, such as un- or 
underemployed young men. To tie them into his network of supporters, the mayor provided traditional 
community police networks, rondas, with uniforms, lassos (the symbol of their authority) and the 
transportation for training they received in the regional capital. For community events, the rondas were 
given short-term jobs to maintain crowd security and order. In addition, one of the members of the 
provincial council elected on the mayor's ticket had been in the rondas. 
The non-EI Gol provinces demonstrated several differences from the El Gol provinces. Some of 
these differences were evident in the quantitative data presented above. The qualitative comments that 
accompanied the experiment provide further detail. In Anta, there is a pro-poor mayor who pioneered 
participation in previous administrations of a smaller rural district in the same province, Limatambo. He 
was now mayor of the provincial head, but it was clear that rights-based and pro-poor practices were still 
elusive. One of those present explained in graphic detail. 
For me personally, participatory planning is the most important thing we can do. Unfortunately, the 
average person here could not give a fart about participation. They want work, cement, and projects 
they can see and touch. The people do not care if a mayor is corrupt, dictatorial and atheist; they only 
care about work. 
The notion of participation as a wav to build political support did not appear to operate in the non-El Gol 
provinces. Political support was a purely short-term, material exchange. One councilperson explained the 
nature of his political links to citizens. 
People ask me for two things in exchange for their vote: work and booze . . . I know that I have a 
responsibility to provide services, but it is much more important to give out jobs. When a drought or 
some crisis happens, people are starving. Work can mean the difference between life and death. 
The mayor of Anta had implemented a participatory planning mechanism in his home district, and he 
intended to begin such an endeavour in the future. For the moment, he explained why participatory and 
long-term planning had not developed: 
Our culture used to be rich in planning. Machu Picchu would not exist without serious planning and 
participation, nor the other wonders of the Incas. But the invaders came, they took the land, they 
gave it to the Spaniards and the rnistis. Authoritarian governments continued to the present dav. Who 
can blame us for not trusting planning or investing in land and houses; we have no security! We are 
afraid to take those risks. They have tried to plan in the past, but it stays as ink on paper. There is no 
money behind it. 
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In Ollachea, the mayor was favourable to participation, but he was largely unconvinced that it was realistic 
in his province. 
Participation is important, but we have no idea how to put it in place. We have six thousand people 
in our town, most are close to extreme poverty and many are single mothers with abandoned kids . . . 
They know nothing about participation. Really, for them, participation is just extra. 
At the insistence of the mayor of Macusani, Ollachea had attempted some open meetings to discuss 
priorities. The meetings were not understood as part of enhancing rights, however, and there was little 
pro-poor about the outcome. In addition, litde effort was made to reach groups that were traditionally 
excluded. 
The good thing about participation is that people cannot blame the city council after making 
decisions. People chose the projects, so they cannot attack us if the projects do not work . . . We 
invite them to meetings in the town, and none of the people from the rural areas show up . . . 
Sometimes, they are not even told when the meetings occur . . . Only the organised people, like 
teachers, come. The other people who come look for work, and when there is none, they get angry 
with us. We lose credibility. 
The city council came up with a development plan . . . We went to the participatory meetings, and 
the projects were approved. Then, all the money was gone, and there was nothing left to fund all the 
other demands people made . . . Everything was expected to fall on the municipality. 
The mayor of Ollachea was sincere in looking for ways to improve participation, and he sensed the 
political utility of using participation to build a network of supporters. Yet, his idea of a network was 
much closer to a traditional clientelist exchange than a rights-based and pro-poor network, and he was 
clearly worried about losing political control over participatory spaces. 
We want to pay people to participate and give them a lunch when they do. That would bring them 
into politics. If we tried to give everyone something, the province would be bankrupt. 
The qualitative and quantitative responses from the provincial authorities suggest that much new was 
occurring in El Gol provinces, even as some things remained the same. To begin it should be clear that in 
both El Gol and non-El Gol provinces, clientelist practices continued to direct material benefits to 
particular groups in exchange for political support. Still, the degree of clientelism was different in El Gol 
provinces. Local authorities appeared to be conscious of participation as a rights-based approach to 
governance and a way of promoting pro-poor policy. Moreover, they displayed a sophisticated 
understanding of the way in which formal institutions of participation could be structured for maximum 
political effect. They structured participation to overcome opposition, target core supporters with benefits, 
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and distribute benefits to potential allies among the poor. This represents an important advance from 
traditional clientelist practices that continued in non-El Gol provinces. 
Local findings 
El Gol contributed to the efforts of new local authorities to build viable institutions in the context of 
weak state, fragmented civil society, and intense poverty. The institutions that could operate in this 
context introduced pro-poor, rights-based approaches to contexts with persistent clientelism. 
The reality of local social practices continue to reinforce traditional clientelism. Traditional 
clientelism persists because it rests on deep roots that involve social and status distinction. For example, 
one El Gol partner described a town festival in which a 100 sol prize was given to the grower of the 
largest potato, an honour many peasants might compete and claim. By contrast, the owner of the cock 
that won the cock-fight won 100 dollars. Only wealthy patrons with money and time to travel to the coast 
and buy a large cock could win this prize. The importance was not entirely the money difference. There 
was status associated with a masculine blood-sport in which only those with resources could hope to win. 
This reinforced the dominance of the patrons with respect to clients. 
Social norms continue to militate against the full realisation of rights and participation for women, as 
well. One mayor commented in front of the entire council, including the one female member, 'If there 
were no law requiring us to get women onto our lists, we wouldn't bother'. 
Still, important female leaders were clearly emerging. In one Cusco community, a council-woman, 
Mary, described the scandal that she had uncovered. 'The mayor is a professional who had come to work 
in the communities. He learned Quechua to make himself look nice, but in fact he was corrupt — a wolf in 
sheep's clothing. Once, a distributor from the PRONA glass of milk programme bought the mayor off 
during the town anniversary. The distributor paid 20,000 soles to get the milk contract. Then, the mayor 
used the soles to buy beer and sell it at a profit during the anniversary. Who had the license to sell the 
beer? Why, it was his family! Hverybodv knows the mayors take kickbacks on the social programmes. 
Around 2 per cent is what all the distributors add to their costs. It's even worse with municipal jobs; all of 
(hem go to the family members of the mayor'. El Gol projects to educate local authorities and citizens 
increased awareness about the proper utilisation of public funds. In particular, public debates and efforts 
to promote programmatic campaigns appeared to have some effect. 
El Gol partners have to be realistic about their impact. Most candidates used El Gol events to claim 
a bit of free publicity. Their platforms hardly differed and were not particularly developed. They continued 
to use traditional clientelist techniques to build support and sustain unequal relations. In Tambobamba, 
the mayor complained that his supporters had campaigned tirelessly as thev had been trained, but his rival 
swept in and won a rural community by buying beer and holding a party the day before the election. 
Traditional clientelist practices were deep-rooted, and elites manipulated traditional mechanisms to claim 
power. In Colquemarca, one female council-member explained the behaviour of traditional elites who 
kept one foot in urban centres and one in the rural municipalities. 'One candidate had a family name, and 
everybody knew he had money and was a doctor from the city. When he got here, he was just the same as 
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the people we had before . . . People who come back from the city say they are the ones who bring 
development projects because they have connections to important people. If we want more projects, we 
have to give them our vote'. 
Box 2 Local findings 
Context Local level is characterised by poverty, fragmented and unequal civil society, and weak 
institutions. Clientelism thrives in this context and traditional patrons exchange material and 
particularist benefits in ways that perpetuate inequality while limiting client demands. 
Positive signs • Progressive movements articulate pro-poor and rights-based approaches that slowly 
transform clientelism. 
• These approaches targeted previously neglected areas and citizens. 
• Citizens gained ownership over projects and rights to hold government accountable. 
• Leaders structured participation to favour poor and rural citizens. 
Negative signs • Traditional clientelism continued in most districts. 
• Even progressive leaders faced attacks from traditional client networks. 
• Progressive leaders facing resource and capacity constraints could easily slip into 
previous patterns of distribution. 
• Local leaders had little capacity to influence the pattern of politics outside their districts. 
Regional findings 
The regional reality in Peru includes weak parties, weak civil society, and an elite class that has reinserted 
traditional clientelist practices to regional institutions. Incipient opposition and popular movements were 
making inroads, but thev had largely failed to penetrate political power at the regional level. El Gol 
worked with a bottom-up strategy that fortified pro-poor mayors and a centre-peripherv strategy that 
attempted to use a Lima-base to influence the rules shaping regional behaviour. It would be fair to say that 
both efforts demonstrated some success. In Puno, for example, coalitions of pro-poor mayors and 
opposition movements have clearly placed pressure on regional authorities and forced a distribution of 
resources away from traditional clientelist networks and towards the rural areas. They have also claimed 
spaces for their own voice and participation at the regional level. The Lima-based lobbying has created 
legislation to strengthen the weight of participatory and consultative entities as formal institutions in 
regional government. 
Despite these important advances, a few warnings about the potential for a pro-poor and rights-
based approach at the regional level are in order. First, it is clear that the national government is sceptical 
of the potential for effective regional governance, and the Organic Law of the Regions reflects that 
unease. The revenues and authority transferred to the regions are wholly inadequate to undertake major 
functions, and some of these functions transferred are probably more appropriately located at another 
level of government. For example, hydroelectric and production authority are to be transferred to regions 
despite the obvious cross-regional importance, and it would be no surprise if such functions are not fully 
transferred or are transferred and then re-absorbed by the centre. Second, it is also clear that authorities in 
the regions are sceptical of institutions biased towards pro-poor and rights-based approaches. Regional 
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authorities are evidently minimising the importance of the CCRs and using patronage to influence the 
behaviour of province and district mayors. 
Finally, the CCRs themselves are flawed. As consultative and consensus-building entities, CCRs lack 
real teeth to hold regional authorities accountable. The 40 per cent threshold for civil society participation 
and the registration requirement for civil society organisations are likely to constrain the capacity of many 
opposition groups. A higher percentage would be able to express real opposition, and looser registration 
requirements would allow representatives of poorer citizens greater access. In sum, the pro-poor and 
rights-based approaches that El Gol advanced at the regional level made some important, though limited 
advances. The ability of mayors and movements to insert themselves at the regional level will likely 
depend on their ability to coordinate actions in an organised fashion at regional level and find resources 
and allies externally. 
Box 3 Regional findings 
Context Authority in Peru's regions is generally characterised by weak parties, weak civil society, and 
traditional elite patrons. 
Positive signs • Coalitions of pro-poor mayors and movements exert pressure and redirect resources to rural 
areas, especially through participatory mechanisms. 
• Allies to these movements lobbied in Lima to strengthen participatory and consultative 
entities in regional government. 
• New consultative spaces such as the CCRs open room to pressure regional presidents for 
distribution and transparency. 
Negative signs • Traditional clientelism continued among regional elite. 
• Pressure from progressive mayors and civil society easily captured or distorted towards 
clientelist patterns. 
• National parties doing little to discipline regional presidents nor link them together. 
Final observations 
Despite the political, economic, and social inequalities that reinforce traditional clientelism, much can be 
learned from the El Gol experience. It is not that El Gol eliminated the problems of poverty and weak 
institutions. These are real, and they continue. El Gol electoral assistance brought a rights-based and pro-
poor approach. In effect, this improved on clientelism. Traditional clientelist relationships distributed 
material benefits to enhance the power of patrons and reinforce inequality and inefficiency. In El Gol 
districts, rights-based participation channelled benefits to poor supporters and potential allies. 
At the centre of the new governance institutions lie participatory institutions and the rights-based 
approach. Participation engaged citizens in policy formulation and decision-making. By incorporating 
them in decision-making, they were given ownership and responsibility to ensure the success of policies. 
They offered their own resources and time to the public good, and thev used participator}7 spaces to hold 
authorities accountable. 
The key innovation in rural Peru was a strategic structure of participation. Institutions structure who 
gets to participate and whose voices are heard. By biasing the sites of participation and the pattern of 
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decision-making towards the poor and rural districts, these voices were privileged. As a result, the poor 
could mobilise to obtain material resources. 
In addition, these resources were distributed neither arbitrarily nor altruistically. New patterns of 
governance have to manage scarce resources among multiple claimants, just as traditional clientelism did. 
Resource-starved local authorities continued to include some citizens and meet their demands while 
excluding or denying the demands of others. WTiat changed was the basis on which these decisions were 
made. Under the new governance institutions, benefits were tied to active participation in the participatorv 
institutions. This reinforced the notion that citizens receive their benefits on the basis of their active links 
to local authorities. Those that do not participate, either by choice or because their voices have been 
structured out of the political debate, do not receive benefits. 
New authorities also dealt with scarcity by searching for additional resources to feed expanding 
participatory demands. The primary mechanism for securing these resources were cross-jurisdiction and 
inter-governmental. Governments linked across districts and provinces served the useful benefit of 
granting each leader a wider area to draw resources. They could pool administrative, material and other 
resources that could then be targeted through participatory institutions. Equally important, these alliances 
could be used to great effect to secure resources from higher level governments. Operating as a unified 
lobbying force, several local districts could pressure and secure additional central and regional government 
resources. These too could be used to meet local demands articulated through participatory institutions. 
In sum, what began as an electoral assistance programme was actually an effort to bring a rights-
based and pro-poor approach to local governance. El Gol partners contributed to a transformation in 
traditional patterns of unequal and inefficient clientelism. In its place, a new and improved style of 
governance emerged. Participation and pro-poor policies were central to these new institutional practices. 
A real risk exists that new governance patterns can slip back into traditional clientelism. (1) The 
privileged sites of participation for the poor cannot be allowed to disappear or slip into exclusionary 
mechanisms captured by the rich. (2) To date, cross-district alliances have largely concentrated on securing 
additional resources for each district. This effort should continue. In addition, they should consider 
coordinating the way in which they build political support. A shared set of institutions, policies, and 
practices can ensure that such cross-district collaboration continues on the basis of participatory 
institutions and pro-poor policies. (3) Finally, intergovernmental coordination should be enhanced. In 
particular, the weak institutions at the regional level should be strengthened. Ideally, cross-district alliances 
based on rights-based and pro-poor policies would build institutions that aggregated political support on a 
regional level. 
The political development implied by El Gol partnerships deserves attention. El Gol NGOs from 
urban areas are performing the tasks of organising poor citizens, articulating a new set of social norms, 
and offering resources and capacity to local leaders. One cannot help but be struck by the institutional 
composition of these NGOs. They are staffed by middle class activists and intellectuals. 
This is significant for two reasons. First, urban NGOs working in rural areas bring middle class 
values, resources, and skills to isolated communities where there is at best a weak middle class. The 
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entrance of these NGOs has a transformative effect in which poor rural citizens gain a new awareness of 
their rights and an ability to articulate demands. A more active civil society complicates attempts to 
impose traditional clientelism, and old style patrons cannot so easily manage client demands and exclude 
or repress popular organisation. 
The second significant aspect of extending the reach of urban NGOs to rural areas is that it provides 
an alternative to clientelist political alliances. Instead of turning to traditional authorities, poor rural 
citizens can find allies in the urban middle class that staffs NGOs. This generates resources, leadership, 
and institutional protection for the rural poor. In exchange, middle sectors get the transparent and 
efficient government that they value. 
It is curious that political parties have not learned more from partners like El Gol: it is perhaps a 
testament to the weakness and patronage orientation of most Peruvian parties. The actors at the centre of 
El Gol partnerships, the urban - middle class, intelligentsia - are exacdy the people one would expect to 
be leading a progressive political party. The weak and disastrous history of Peruvian parties has driven 
progressive sectors into NGOs as the only alternative avenue for political articulation. 
To make the rights-based and pro-poor agenda a nationally viable, progressive movement, political 
parties will need to take it on board. The same middle class urban and poor rural alliance that El Gol 
NGOs are building could act as an electorally powerful alternative. One would like to end on a positive 
note that such a future is possible. The reality, however, is that political parties are extremely weak and 
generally do not advance a rights based and pro-poor agenda. Idealistic and progressive politicians exist in 
individual jurisdictions, but thev have been unable to connect movements across jurisdictions and levels. 
El C iol has laid the blueprint and charted the path, now greater political buy-in is necessary. 
Box 4 Implications 
Local 
implications 
The key determinant of change at the local level is the viability of a progressive 
alternative to traditional clientelism. Such alternatives are only forthcoming if local 
leaders can resolve problems of poverty, fragmented and unequal civil society, and weak 
institutions. Pro-poor and rights-based participation can help resolve these problems in 
local jurisdictions. They can bias authority structures and policy towards previously 
neglected communities and provide a defense against traditional patrons. Still, the 
sustainability of such solutions depends on external alliances. Such alliances are 
currently only forthcoming from like-minded local leaders and NGOs. Both these allies 
are useful, but not sufficient. They possess neither the resources to sustain progressive 
movements over time, nor the institutional protection to defend against competitors, 
especially those from wider patronage networks. To sustain rights-based and pro-poor 
alternatives, allies at higher levels of government and among the political elite will be 
necessary. 
Regional 
implications 
• National government is sceptical of regional government units. 
• Regional governments lack power and resources. 
• Regional authorities distrust pro-poor and rights based approaches. 
• Consultative institutions at the regional level are weak. 
Reformist coalitions building on successful local experiences need help to supplant 
regional and national clientelist elites. Local civil society is evolving with the help of 
assistance from the donor and NGO sector. Yet, political society is lagging. Support from 
national legislators and parties will be important to constructing alternative regional and 
national movements. 
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Appendix 1: Methodology for district evaluation 
Much of our information about the districts was gleaned from discussions with El Gol partners 
themselves. \\"e followed the basic chronology of El Gol in organising our questions for these actors, 
asking them what they did first, second, etc. As observers of multiple jurisdictions, we also asked them to 
help us identify communities for further investigation. In particular, they helped us to identify similarities 
and differences across the municipalities that we could pursue further and test during our visits. 
In each district, we attempted to conduct individual interviews with members of the district 
administration, the mayor, and the city council. These interviews were semi-structured, following a basic 
set of questions that were organised chronologically around the activities of El Gol. Each chronological 
question was followed by a series of probing questions that varied with the responses offered to the 
chronological questions. As much as possible, we returned to the chronological string of questions to 
provide some consistency across interviews and comparability in the information obtained. 
1. What projects did El Gol partners undertake with you during the campaign? What were your 
impressions? 
2. What projects did El Gol partners undertake with other authorities during the campaign? What were 
your impressions? 
3. What projects did El Gol partners undertake with community-members during the campaign? What 
were your impressions? 
4. What projects did El Gol partners undertake with you during the elections themselves? What were 
your impressions? 
5. What projects did El Gol partners undertake with other authorities during the elections themselves? 
What were your impressions? 
6. What projects did El Gol partners undertake with community-members during the elections 
themselves? What were your impressions? 
7. What happened after the elections? Did you continue with El Gol collaboration? What were your 
impressions? 
8. What happened after the elections? Did other authorities continue with El Gol collaboration? What 
were your impressions? 
9. What happened after the elections? Did members of the community continue with El Gol 
collaboration? What were your impressions? 
It quickly became apparent that our visits were public events in which many members of the community 
and local authorities wanted to participate. They were all eager to be interviewed, and most individual 
interviews quicklv evolved into focus group sessions. We modified our approach once this reality became 
apparent, and designed the comparative study of four El Gol and Non-El Gol districts. We chose the four 
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districts of Tambobamba, Anta, Macusani, and Ollachea. Tambobamba and Macusani were districts in 
which El Gol partners had already done significant work. Anta and Ollachea were expected to be 
incorporated into FA Gol partner projects shordy. 
Respondents in each district included mayors and members of the city council; and in one district, 
members of the executive bureaucracy participated. The total number of respondents was 45, and all 
districts had at least 10 respondents. 
Tambobamba Anta Macusani Ollachea 
Total participants 11 10 12 12 
Women 2 2 2 1 
In each district, we read a series of paired comparisons, and those present were asked to vote which of the 
two priorities they preferred. The paired comparisons included four options (jobs, product prices, basic 
services, and participatory planning). There were six pairs (jobs-prices, jobs-services, etc). 
Product prices and 
productive 
infrastructure 
Basic services 
(electricity, water, 
others) 
Participatory 
planning 
Work 
Product prices and 
infrastructure 
Basic services (electricity, 
water, others) 
The process was explained at the outset, and respondents were presented the paired comparisons with as 
little definition of the priorities as possible. Explanations of the priorities were offered when asked, and 
some respondents attempted to provide their own definitions either during or after the vote. Respondents 
were asked to vote and explain their vote. 
After the first round of voting and discussion, we offered the same sequence of paired priorities to 
the respondents and they were asked to vote again. After the second vote, there was another discussion. 
For the discussion after the first round and second round of voting, we asked a series of questions 
based on the responses. For example, the respondents in Tambobamba favoured work over product 
prices bv a nine to one margin in the first vote. We asked respondents to explain their own vote and why 
they thought the overall vote turned out the way it did. In particular, we made sure the dissenting or 
minority voices could defend their position. In the Tambobamba case, it was the mayor who had voted to 
favour work. 
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Appendix 2: Interviews 
Category Post District, Province 
APURIMAC 
Civil Society Community Activists Tambobamba, Cotabambas 
Officials Mayors and Council-members Tambobamba, Cotabambas 
CUSCO 
Civil Society 
Cesar A. Aguilar Andrade, 
Community Activist Santo Tomas, Chumbivilcas 
Civil Society CADEP NGO Santo Tomas, Chumbivilcas 
Civil Society 
Paulina Romero, Community 
Activist, CADEP 
Colquemarca, Chumbivilcas 
Civil Society 
Ines Condori , Community Activist, 
CADEP Santo Tomas, Chumbivilcas 
Civil Society Willi Alis, Community Activist Llusco, Chumbivilcas 
Civil Society Emilio, Community Activist Santo Tomas, Chumbivilcas 
Civil Society Eurico Villena, Community Activist Santo Tomas, Chumbivilcas 
Civil Society Profesor Remigio Santo Tomas, Chumbivilcas 
Official Neri Contreras, Council-woman Quinota, Chumbivilcas 
Officials Mayor and Council-members Anta 
PUNO 
Civil Society Vicary Juli, Puno 
Civil Society Leonidas, Neighbourhood President Macusani, Carabaya 
Official 
Sabino Molina Pacha, District 
Mayor 
Ituata, Carabaya 
Official Mayor and Council-members Ollachea, Carabaya 
Official 
Ruben Dari'o, Transport 
Commission 
Macusani, Carabaya 
Official 
Justo Maca Caceres, Territorial 
Delegate, Mixed Commission 
Macusani, Carabaya 
Official Asea, Ex - Municipal Candidate Santo Tomas, Chumbivilcas, Cusco 
Official Nelly Anco, Budget Officer Macusani, Carabaya 
Official Fabio Porras, Council-man Macusani, Carabaya 
Official 
Quizpe Gutierrez, Council-man, 
Economic Commission 
Macusani, Carabaya 
Official 
Ali Palomino Quizpe, Council-
woman, Culture and Education 
Commission 
Macusani, Carabaya 
Official 
Julio Ocuno, Council-man, 
Participation, Citizenship and 
Human Development Commission 
Macusani, Carabaya 
Official 
Arnaldo, Council-man, Personnel 
and Commerce Commission 
Macusani, Carabaya 
Official 
Fidel Montegua, Council-man, 
President of Local Security 
(Rondas) 
Macusani, Carabaya 
4 1 
Official 
Maximo Torres, Council-man, Basic 
Services 
Macusani, Carabaya 
Official 
Pilar Velarda Montesinos, Council-
woman, Agropecuniary 
Commission 
Macusani, Carabaya 
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Appendix 3: International electoral assistance experience 
EI Gol attempted to transform clientelest practices by introducing pro-poor and rights-based approaches. 
This was a significant departure from traditional elections assistance, which generally does not attempt a 
fundamental rearranging of power relations. In general, DFID and international electoral assistance 
focuses on free and fair elections in new democracies. In many of these countries authoritarian rule is a 
recent memory; political conflict takes occasionally violent forms; extreme poverty affects many; and 
institutional frameworks are extremely weak. As a result, assistance emphasises basic institutional 
strengthening, election-dav monitoring, and international cooperation (Walker 2003). On these issues, the 
Peruvian experience strengthens and expands already existing knowledge. In addition, the Peruvian 
experience expands knowledge of appropriate interventions in contexts of weak parties, incipient 
democracy, and fragile society. 
Even by the most minimal standards, electoral assistance is not always successful. For example, 
during most of Nepal's history, undemocratic regimes opened only partially and intermittently to 
12 
democratic processes at only the local level. After a quiet revolution in 1992, a UK-style parliamentary 
democracy with a constitutional monarch was installed. By the time of the 1999 elections, two, perhaps 
three, viable personalistic and patronage-based parties and a plethora of splinter parties had emerged, 
largely led by aged veterans of the pro-democracy movement. The international assistance that occurred 
focused on the elections themselves and included an effective, military-style, UN mission that monitored 
elections to protect against fraud or intimidation. Subsequent institutional strengthening had been a 
priority, but most of the funding targeted official institutions or entities located in the capital city. Some 
attempt at decentralised governance was initiated, but this was poorly developed and served to fragment 
an already small country into 75 even smaller and administratively difficult districts. In isolated rural areas, 
Mao-ist guerrillas blocked electoral participation and electoral assistance. As a result, the monitoring 
mission barely reached some areas, and civic education and institution-building did not occur. Ultimately, 
democratic institutions and electoral assistance were served a harsh lesson. The constitutional monarch 
recently decided to dissolve parliament and reimpose autocratic rule. 
Electoral assistance usually does not precede returns to authoritarianism, but neither does it always 
lead to significant advances in democratic practice. In Zimbabwe, a single, dominant, ruling party was 
intent on sham elections in 2003.13 Electoral legislation changed in the week preceding elections; 
opposition parties were restricted; the media was controlled; police and security forces selectively applied 
the law; monitoring was by invitation only; and opposition supporters faced violence and intimidation. In 
this context, free and fair elections were distant hopes for DFID and international donors. Instead, they 
did what they could to assist local non-governmental organisations as they promoted civic education and 
12 The authors would like to thank Ian McKendry, former DFID governance advisor to Nepal, for his insights. 
13 The authors would like to thank Luke Mukubvu, DFID advisor, for his insights on the Zimbabwe experience. 
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election monitoring. Ultimately, examples such as Zimbabwe and Nepal suggest that election assistance 
may not always deepen democracy. In such situations, perhaps the best that can be hoped is that election 
assistance at least does not weaken hopes for democracy. 
In Rwanda, election assistance faced a slighdy different challenge and emerged somewhat more 
positively.'4 Ethnic violence had only recently subsided and the country lacked even the most basic 
constitutional and governance framework. As a result, there was a real risk of return to politically 
motivated and ethnically inflamed violence, and the main objective was to make a marginal advance 
towards electoral democracy. Elections occurred in two stages in which voters first approved a new 
constitution and next voted in elections for legislators and the president. The elections were not free of 
irregularities, including the imprisonment of an important opposition candidate and the legal prohibition 
of an (admittedly ethnic) opposition party. Instead of focusing on these and other irregularities, most 
assistance aimed to strengthen basic electoral institutions and election-day monitoring and operated 
through an international consortium of donors working closely with government. The party that won 
represented a peaceful solution and held together a multi-ethnic coalition, and the results were largely 
supported by the international community. 
In the context of historical ethnic divisions in a new democracy, donors face the task of cultivating 
an informed and engaged population. In Eastern Europe, many areas had been ethnically cleansed.'" In 
particular, elections in small, rural towns were particularly tenuous. Ethnic minority inhabitants had 
suffered persecution, many had left, and those few that returned or remained faced very real fears of 
reprisal if they actively participated. In addition, since the end of the conflict, elections for one authority 
or another had occurred virtually every year, and there was barely room or time for much more than 
election-day observation by international donors. On the other hand, the Dayton Agreement that brought 
peace to Kosovo gave international observers a special mandate to wield their influence, and they directed 
attention to rural areas and returned refugees. Election songs, radio programmes, and lottery schemes 
aimed to increase participation. Additional interventions required candidates to reveal their campaign 
finance to ensure that war profiteers were not included on party lists. Despite many flaws, most observers 
were satisfied that elections in Bosnia and Kosovo marked a significant departure from the ethnic violence 
that preceded. 
In some instances, the major dilemma facing donors occurs after the elections, rather than before or 
during. In Zambia, multiparty elections began in 1991 after the end of one-party rule under Kaunda.'6 
Despite multiparty elections, the rules for participation were increasingly restrictive and opposition parties 
boycotted the 1996 elections. In 2001, the outcome was decided by 34 thousand out of 2.5 million votes, 
and most observers judged the elections flawed, perhaps to the degree that flaws influenced the outcome. 
The authors would like to thank Rupert Bladon, DFID Governance advisor formerly in Rwanda and currently 
in Ethiopia. 
Tomas Dackwailer, of the New Centre for International Peace Operations, provided generous observations on 
Bosnia and Kosovo. 
Anna Wilde, DFID Governance Advisor, provided valuable comments based on her experience in Zambia. 
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Still, the opposition had significant representation in the legislature, media was more active, and civil 
society was building capacity. As a result, most observers emphasised a longer term perspective in their 
post-election evaluations. Instead of outright condemnation, they offered criticisms and encouragement to 
greater democratisation in the future. They had to be particularly careful because thev did not want valid 
critiques to be twisted into anti-Western rhetoric by the dominant party. The Zambia experience was 
contrasted to other situations in which strong condemnation by international observers was made after 
elections. In Russia's Duma elections, limitations on the media marred proceedings, and international 
observers chose to criticise. Similarly, in the Zimbabwe example mentioned above, strong condemnation 
by observers was also judged the only way to maintain pressure on the government. 
Other contexts may share more similarities with the Peruvian context of weak parties moving slowly 
away from authoritarian rule. In Nigeria, the transition to democratic rule that occurred in 1999 left the 
country with a weak constitutional framework for elections.17 A national electoral commission and various 
state commissions were left the task of designing an electoral framework, including the timing of elections, 
the demarcation of boundaries, and the registration of voters and parties. Legislative, executive, and 
judicial pressures have been brought to bear on the commission, and state election commissions were 
widely expected to manipulate upcoming local elections. In a relatively resource rich context where 
democracy is recent and poverty widespread, the "money politics" of powerful agents dominates. Local 
and national patrons with bountiful funds for campaign finance swing elections, and parties fail to 
mobilise serious cleavages or debate. Electoral assistance has continued to emphasise institutional 
strengthening but has broadened to include election monitoring, citizen education, and party-building. In 
these efforts, civil society organisations have been important collaborators. Still, the Nigerian case 
exemplifies the challenges faced in incipient democracies where institutional protections are weak, and 
powerful individuals and actors use wealth and institutional control to bias democratic outcomes. 
Though all of the experiences offer important insights, the Nigerian case brings up some of the most 
obvious parallels to rural Peru. Electoral assistance can clearly not be limited to election-day observation 
and post-election evaluation, though both are important to nudging young democracies forward. 
Institutional development, party-building, and citizen education pose particular challenges to contexts in 
which democracy is recent, poverty is endemic, and parties and party systems do a poor job of linking 
state and society. In these contexts, international electoral assistance includes a pro-poor and party-
building component. In the Peruvian context, this has included supporting efforts to build a rights-based 
and pro-poor orientation at the local level. What is unusual about Peru is that these ideals have been 
integrated with clientelist practices normally considered incompatible with rights-based approaches. The 
key innovation observed in Peru was the introduction of pro-poor, rights-based approaches to transform 
clientelist solutions to scarcity and political weakness. 
Many of these observations are drawn from comments by Sam Unom, DFID officer in Nigeria, and 
documents by Tim Sheehy and Victoria Erdoo-lbi funded by DFID. 
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Pro-Poor, Rights-Based Approaches 
in the Presence of Peruasive Clientelism 
In 2002 the UK Department for International Development provided 
electoral assistance for local and regional elections in Peru. Partners 
included 23 NGOs, local governments, and national government 
policymakers. The mission was to create local electoral processes that 
were more inclusive of poor, excluded people in rural areas. This 
mission quickly expanded to undertake a wider transformation of 
citizen attitudes, government practices, and national institutions. The 
programmes were gathered under the heading El Gol, and they 
targeted five Andean highland departments of Peru. The programmes 
applied a rights-based and pro-poor approach to electoral assistance 
with particular attention to poor, rural, local districts. This report 
evaluates the impact of El Gol using a political framework that 
emphasises the operation of rights-based and pro-poor approaches in 
the context of clientelist local authorities. The report finds that rights-
based, participatory practices can encourage transformation of 
clientelist settings to promote more pro-poor outcomes. 
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